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1. Introduction 
 
"Given Mercosur's economic growth, I see important opportunities for EU exporters, 
investors and service providers in this region in the coming years. […] A balanced and 
ambitious free trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur could therefore bring 
substantial economic benefits to both sides and contribute to the economic recovery."  
EU Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, 20101  
 
Thirteen years after the European Union (EU) and the Common Market of the South 
(Mercado Común del Sur – Mercosur) officially launched the negotiations on an Association/ 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) the two blocs have still not been able to come to an agreement, 
nor does it seem like that an agreement will be reached in the closest future. Even though the 
EU and Mercosur have not yet been able to come to an agreement, the case of their 
interregional negotiations and relations deserve special attention. An eventual FTA between 
the two blocs is a highly interesting case as it would be the first of its kind between two 
customs unions. Secondly it would be the biggest free trade area in the world.2  
Representatives from the European Union and Mercosur have stressed the positive 
outcomes an association, or eventually a FTA between the European Union and Mercosur 
would have since the negotiations on an agreement were launched in 2000. When the 
negotiations were relaunched in 2010, after stalling in 2004, both blocs once again expressed 
their commitment to coming to an agreement. Why have the two blocs spent this much time 
coming to an agreement and not yet been able to make it? De Gucht´s statement serves as an 
example of the belief in an association/FTA that has driven the two blocs to continue 
negotiating for such a prolonged time. Even though an association agreement/FTA would be 
beneficial for both blocs in many ways, an agreement would also have a negative impact on 
various sectors in the two blocs (for instance the agricultural sector in the EU and the service 
and automobile sector in Mercosur). The dense web of actors, differing opinions, intra- and 
inter-bloc friction make the negotiations highly complex and difficult. 
 
                                                        
1 Commissioner Karel De Gucht to discuss EU-Mercosur trade negotiations (2013) Available from: 
http://brussels.cta.int/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=4778:commissioner-karel-de-gucht-to-discuss-
eu-mercosur-trade-negotiations (Accessed 14.05.13); EU Trade commissioner in Brazil to advance trade talks 
with Mercosur (2010) Available from http://en.mercopress.com/2010/09/13/eu-trade-commissioner-in-brazil-to-
advance-trade-talks-with-mercosur (Accessed 10.04.13) 
2 Mahrukh Doctor (2007) ”Why Bother With Interregionalism? Negotiations for a European Union-Mercosur 
Agreement” in JCMS 2007 Volume 45. Number 2. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., pp. 281-314, p.282 
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Even though many aspects of the EU-Mercosur relations have been studied, there has not yet 
been done any larger study of the negotiations after the relaunch in comparison with the ones 
from 2000 until 2004. Most of the work that has been done upon the EU-Mercosur 
interregional relations has either focused on the rounds of negotiations before they stalled in 
2004, or after they were relaunched in 2010. I have therefore investigated the following 
questions in this thesis: “Why did and do the EU and Mercosur want to negotiate an 
Association/Free Trade Agreement?” and “Why have the EU and Mercosur not yet been able 
to reach an agreement?”. This thesis therefore takes a deeper look into and compares the 
rounds of negotiations between the EU and Mercosur before they stalled in 2004, and the 
rounds of negotiation after the relaunch in 2010. The thesis will further analyze and discuss 
why the two blocs decided to engage in interregional relations in the first place, and why they 
have not yet been able to come to an agreement. The different contexts in which the rounds of 
negotiations took place when they were launched in 2000 and until they stalled in 2004, 
compared to the context in which the negotiations were relaunched in 2010 are important to 
understand the situation today. In order to discuss and analyze these questions, the theory of 
interregionalism will be used.  
Interregionalism can be understood as a relationship between two regional groups in 
two different regions of the world, like the EU and Mercosur, or a comprehensive relationship 
that covers different pillars of cooperation through frequent work and meetings at various 
official levels.3 Interregionalism can also be perceived as a process of widening and 
deepening interactions between two regional groups.4 In general, interregionalism is built on a 
low level of institutionalism where the blocs rely on their own institutions.5   
As the study of interregionalism from a theoretical perspective is in its infancy, there 
is not yet one common definition of the term, but rather various approaches and attempts to 
describe and explain the case of interregionalism. I have mainly used the theoretical work of 
the political scientists Jürgen Rüland, Heiner Hänggi and Ralf Roloff in this thesis, as they 
represent a very important foundation in the study of interregionalism.6 Rüland has presented 
                                                        
3 Alan Hardacre (2008) The EU and Complex Interregionalism: The Case of Latin America. Doctoral thesis. 
Loughbourough University, p.IX 
4 Ralf Roloff (2006) ”Interregionalism in theoretical perspective. State of the art” in Hänggi, Heiner et al. (ed.) 
Interregionalism and International Relations. 1st edition. London: Routledge, pp.17-30 p.18 
5 Jürgen Rüland (2002) ”Inter- and Transregionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research 
Agenda” in National Europe Centre Paper No.35. Paper prepared for the Workshop on Asia-Pacific Studies in 
Australia and Europe: A Research Agenda for the Future. Australian National University. 
6 Rüland (2002); Rüland (2006) ”Interregionalism. An unfinished agenda” in Hänggi et al. (ed.) (2006) 
Interregionalism and International Relations. 1st edition. London: Routledge, pp. 295-313; Heiner Hänggi et al. 
(2006) ”Interregionalism. A new phenomenon in international relations” in Hänggi et al. (ed) (2006) 
Interregionalism and International Relations. 1st edition. London: Routledge, pp.3-14; Ralf Roloff (2006) 
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five functions of interregionalism: balancing, institution building, rationalizing, agenda-
setting and collective identity-building.7 These functions´ main tasks are to explain underlying 
factors for why regional groups decide to engage in interregional relations, as well as factors 
that might cause stagnation or dead-locks. These functions are therefore important in order to 
understand why the EU and Mercosur decided to engage in interregional negotiations, as well 
as some of the factors that have made it hard to reach an agreement.  
 As the interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur represent a very 
interesting case, various efforts have been made to study it. For instance political scientists 
like Mahrukh Doctor and Sebastian Santander are among some of the researchers that have 
studied the interregional relations between the two regions, and some of the obstacles that 
have made the signing of an agreement hard or even impossible. Doctor has studied the 
negotiations before they stalled in 2004, reasons for why they stalled, and has put much 
emphasis on the impact that the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 
and the changes that the post-Cold War presented and had on the EU-Mercosur negotiations. 
Santander has studied the EU-Mercosur relations and the EU´s role as an “external 
federator”.8 He has further looked more closely at Argentina and Brazil´s roles in Mercosur 
and their impact on the negotiations. Santander has also investigated the interregional 
relations between the two blocs in 2010, and reported an increasing tendency in EU politics in 
increasing its focus on bilateral agreements with Latin American states, instead of 
interregional agreements.9  
The political scientist Alan Hardacre did his doctoral thesis upon the EU and complex 
interregionalism, and has further studied the EU-Mercosur interregional relations in light of 
five functions of interregionalism developed by Rüland. Hardacre gives most credence to the 
balancing function that can be understood in the light of the realist school of theory.10  
I have also consulted work done upon the potential impact of an agreement and other 
possibilities for the two blocs to reach an agreement. The economist Patrick Messerlin has 
published a paper on the political importance of Mercosur for the EU´s interests in the short 
and the medium run. Messerlin concludes that the EU and Mercosur should focus on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
7 Rüland (2006), p.300  
8 Sebastian Santander (2002) ”EU-Mercosur Interregionalism: Facing Up to the South American Crisis and the 
Emerging Free Trade Area of the American” in European Foreign Affairs Reviw 7. pp.491-505; Sebastian 
Santander (2005) The European Partnership with Mercosur: a Relationship Base don Strategic and Neo-liberal 
Principles. Journal of European Integration, 27:3, pp.285-306 
9 Sebastian Santander (2010) ”EU-LA relations: from interregionalism to bilateralism?” in Working Paper #29, 
Programa de América Latina. CAEI Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales 
10 Hardacre (2008) 
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something more reasonably feasible for a decade or so, and rather focus on negating topics 
that are attractive to both and manageable to agree on and implement.11  
I have also chosen to focus on the work of political scientist Andy Klom and the 
Argentine politician Graciela Molle, which have both represented different sides in the Bi-
Regional Negotiations Committee (BNC) as delegates representing the EU (Klom) and 
Mercosur (Molle) throughout various of the EU-Mercosur rounds of negotiations. The work 
of Klom and Molle represent different points of views of the rounds of negotiations until 
2004, and have therefore been used in order to understand some of the friction that exists 
between the two blocs, as well as some of the reasons why coming to an agreement has been 
very hard. While Klom represents a more “pro-EU” approach, Molle clearly takes the side of 
Mercosur and Argentina in particular.12  
In order to study the rounds of negotiation, I have studied the official statements from 
every BNC round of negotiation between the EU and Mercosur, as these are the main rounds 
of the negotiations. The EU and Mercosur have published common official statements from 
these rounds of negotiations that do represent rather technical descriptions of the negotiations. 
It has therefore been important to take the context of the negotiations under consideration, to 
fully understand and being able to interpret the standpoints of the two blocs.  
As Argentina and Brazil are the most influential countries in Mercosur, I have chosen 
to mainly focus on these two countries out of the Mercosur members. These countries do to a 
greater extent impact the politics and decisions within the bloc in comparison with for 
instance Paraguay and Uruguay. 
 In order to answer the thesis´ main questions, the different theoretical aspects of 
interregionalism is first presented and analyzed. Secondly a background chapter outlines the 
international context of which the interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur took 
form and in which the rounds of negotiations were officially launched in 2000. Thirdly, the 
main chapter outlines the international context of which the rounds of negotiations after the 
relaunch in 2010 took place, and still take place. Finally, a concluding discussion chapter then 
aims to answer the thesis´ main questions in light of the theoretical aspects of 
interregionalism.  
                                                        
11 Patrick, Messerlin (2013) The Mercosur – EU Preferential Trade Agreement. A View from Europe. 
No.377/February 2013. CEPS Working Document 
12 Andy Klom (2003) “Mercosur and Brazil: A European Perspective” in International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 79, No. 2, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 351-368; Graciela Molle (2008) 
”Negociación MERCOSUR-Unión Europea”, in Revista del CEI, Comercio Exterior e Integración. Mayo de 
2008. Número 11, pp.95-120 
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As this thesis has a historical and political approach to the EU-Mercosur interregional 
relations, I have mainly studied and investigated openly accessible official sources. The 
material used in this thesis have been collected from official publications (for instance from 
the EU, Mercosur, other official statements from international institutions), web based news 
papers (for instance MercoPress, Página12, Reuters, The Economist), studies and research 
published on interregionalism, the EU-Mercosur relations and negotiations, as well as history 
of the EU and Mercosur/ Latin America. The material represents different aspects of the EU-
Mercosur interregional relations, and I have tried to find publications that represent the 
general understanding of the negotiations, the public opinion, and information that is also 
colored by the EU point of view, or the Mercosur point of view. In this way it is possible to 
get a better understanding of the two blocs´ different approaches towards the negotiations, as 
well as the public´s understanding and opinion about the negotiations between the two blocs. 
It has been important to understand the friction that exists between the blocs, as the EU and 
Mercosur have not yet been able to come to an agreement. The sources have not been able to 
give a clear answer to one of the thesis´ main questions: why the two blocs have not managed 
to come to an agreement, but on the other hand many hints to different possible reasons. The 
main task has therefore been to focus on the most important reasons that seem to have had 
most impact on the two blocs and their will to negotiate, as well as the lack of coming to an 
agreement. 
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2. Interregionalism from a Theoretical Perspective 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s there was a chain of changes that affected international relations. One 
of the major changes was a resurgence of international regionalism.13 This means that there 
was a second wave of regional institution building. This second wave differed in several ways 
from the first wave of regional organizations in the 1950s and 1960s. While in the earlier 
period the regional organizations emerged primarily in Europe and Latin-America, in the 
second wave regional organizations proliferated all over the world, even in regions that were 
hitherto known as “regions without regionalism”, for example in the Asia-Pacific (for 
instance South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation-SAARC). As well as the 
emergence of new regional organizations, such as Mercosur, the 1980s and 1990s also saw a 
widening and deepening of older regional organizations, such as the EU. The economist and 
political theorist Walt W. Rostow spoke fittingly of the “Coming age of Regionalism”.14 
Regional organizations began to develop their own external relations, and became actors in 
their own right in international relations. There was a clear increase in the number and 
intensity of interregional dialogues in the 1990s. One of the dialogues that have attracted 
much scholarly interest is the relationship between the EU and Mercosur. As the study of 
interregionalism is still in its infancy, the EU-Mercosur relation makes an interesting case.15 
As there is not yet a lot of research on the aspects of interregionalism, theorists have 
not yet managed to gather around one leading definition of the term. In this chapter, some of 
the various definitions of the term will be closer studied and discussed. The theory of 
interregionalism will be important in the further discussion of this thesis´ main theme; the 
evolving relationship between the EU and Mercosur. The following main questions in this 
chapter will therefore be “what is interregionalism?” and “why is interregionalism important 
while studying the relationship between the EU and Mercosur?” 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 In international relations, regionalism can be defined as a “development of institutionalized cooperation 
among states and other actors on the basis of regional contiguity as a feature of the international system”; John 
Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (ed.) (2008) “Glossary” in The globalization of World Politics. 4 ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.586; Doctor defines regionalism as “the conscious policy of states, a top-
down process, seeking greater regional cooperation on a range of issues from security to the economy”. Doctor 
(2007), p.286 
14 Quoted in Hänggi et al. (2006), p.3-7 
15 Hänggi et al. (2006), p.3-7 
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2.1 Theoretical aspects of interregionalism 
 
Alan Hardacre has noted that interregionalism is not only a new concept, but also a concept 
that does not subscribe to one school of international relations. Accordingly, there are no 
commonly accepted definitions of the term, and there is a large and vibrant debate over a 
large number of issues surrounding the study of interregionalism. 16 No school of theory of 
international relations can satisfyingly explain and analyze interregionalism alone, and one 
therefore has to look at, and use elements from different schools of thought. There are three 
main schools of international theory that deal with interregionalism: realism/neorealism, 
liberal institutionalism and social constructivism. It is mainly from these three theoretical 
approaches to international relations that interregionalism can be apprehended.17 Heiner 
Hänggi notes that there has been a change from mostly focusing on the realist and liberal-
institutionalist schools of theory, to also including and focusing on social constructivism.18  
According to the realist approach, states try to maximize their benefits, using 
diplomacy force, to balance out relations. For realists there is a division between high politics 
(military and security) and low politics (economics and social affairs). The neo-realist 
approach deals with the structure in the international political system, and its impact on the 
system itself. Interregional relations are viewed in terms of power, which is a main device of 
actors in order to maintain equilibrium amongst themselves and periphery regions and actors. 
According to the realist school of theory, international relations are part of a wider struggle 
for power.19 Hardacre suggests that according to realism/ neorealism, interregionalism is 
about balancing and gaining power advantages in international relations. This is seen as 
having purely commercial motivations, therefore suggesting that interregionalism is a strategy 
in order to dominate and expand new markets.20 According to Doctor, one can use the realist 
approach if one focus on the dynamics of regional rivalries.21 Among some of the most 
influential theorists within this school of theory are Hans Morgenthau (classical realism), 
Kenneth Waltz (structural realism/defensive realism), and John Mearsheimer (offensive 
                                                        
16 Hardacre (2008), p.14 
17 Hardacre (2008), p.22 
18 Hänggi et al. (2006), p.8 
19 Hardacre (2008), p.23-24 
20 Hardacre (2008), p.25 
21 Doctor (2007), p.287-288 
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realism).22 Ralf Roloff and Alan Hardacre give more credence to the realist approach to 
interregionalism.23  
From the liberal and institutionalist interpretation, there is a need to institutionalize 
international relations. This institutionalization and development of cooperation is, according 
to this view, the main framework for interregionalism. 24 The liberal-institutionalist approach 
focuses on the cooperative efforts to manage complex interdependence.25 For liberal 
institutionalists cooperation is the key to international relations.26 The institutionalist 
perspective contains aspects from both zero-sum and positive-sum gains, and are 
characterized by the search for security and wealth. There are therefore cooperative as well as 
competitive impulses. There is a dense web of interdependence in international relations that 
results from the search for wealth through trade and investment abroad and this produce 
opportunities to both lower transaction costs and facilitate division of labor, as well as 
dependencies and vulnerabilities. Through cooperation, one can secure additional gains and 
reduce the risks and threats.27 Due to the expansion of regionalism and globalization, there is 
a need to institutionalize at a new level of international relations. Hardacre sees 
interregionalism as a manifestation of this need.28 Influential theorists within the liberalist/ 
institutionalist school of theory are Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (liberal 
institutionalists).29  
According to the constructivist theory, interregionalism can be understood as the 
manifestation of the search for and attempts to develop and create identities on behalf of 
regional actors and organizations.30 If one focus on the identity formation through 
interregional interaction, the constructivist school of theory would be appropriate.31 Social 
                                                        
22 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt (2008) ”Realism” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (ed.) The 
Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations. 4 ed. New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp.90-106, p.95-99 
23 Roloff (2006), p.17-30; Hardacre (2008), p.289-297 
24 Hardacre (2008), p.25 
25 Doctor (2007), p.287-288 
26 Heiner Hänggi (2000), ”Interregioanlism: empirical and theoretical perspectives”, Presented at ”Dollars, 
Democracy and Trade: External Influence on Economic Integration in the Americas”, Los Angeles, May 18, 
2000, p.8-9 
27 Hanns W. Maull & Nuria Okfen (2006) ”Comparing interregionalism. The Asia-Pasific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)” in Hänggi et al. (ed.) (2006) Interregionalism and 
International Relations. 1st edition. London: Routledge, pp.217-233, p.218-219 
28 Hardacre (2008), p.24 
29 Tim Dunne (2008) ”Liberalism” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (ed.) The Globalization of 
World Politics. An introduction to international relations. 4 ed. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.108-
122, p.110; Steven L. Lamy (2008) ”Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realiam and neo-liberalism” in 
John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (ed.) The Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to 
international relations. 4 ed. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.124-141, p.131-132 
30 Hardacre (2008), p.25 
31 Doctor (2007), p.287-288 
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constructivism/ constructivism has a more social and cultural perspective of international 
relations. According to the constructivist school of theory, the materialistic assumptions that 
underline rationalism cannot explain rapid post Cold War changes. According to the 
constructivists, “the reality is constructed by behavior and beliefs and the spread of ideas that 
take form and subsequently become norms”.32 Interregionalism is the result of past 
experiences and interactions, and this again is a manifestation of norms and beliefs, as reality 
built over time. Identity creation and development is crucial for interregional relations 
according to this theory. Interregionalism and regionalism are mutually reinforcing.33 Within 
the social constructivist school of theory, influential theorists are Alexander Wendt, Max 
Weber, and Karl Popper.34 
 
2.2 Defining interregionalism 
 
Hardacre defines interregionalism as a relationship between two regional groups in two 
different regions in the world. He continues that interregionalism can be a relationship like the 
one between the EU and Mercosur; a relationship between two groups in two different regions 
in the world, or “a comprehensive relationship that covers trade, political and cooperation 
pillars through frequent work at all official levels”.35 Roloff defines interregionalism as “a 
process of widening and deepening political, economic and societal interactions between 
international regions”. It is a state actor driven process where systemic (outside) pressures 
reinforce regionalism´s (inside) dynamics.36  
Rüland defines interregionalism as: “group-to-group dialogue with more or less 
regular meetings centering on the exchange of information and cooperation (projects) in 
specific policy fields (trade and investment, environment, crime prevention, narcotics 
trafficking etc.). It is based on a low level of institutionalization […] no common overarching 
institutions, both sides exclusively rely on their own institutional infrastructure”.37 According 
to the definitions of interregionalism, interregionalism has been defined both as a relationship 
or dialogue, or a process. The interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur cover 
                                                        
32 Hardacre (2008), p.25 
33 Hardacre (2008), p.25 
34 Michael Barnett (2008) ”Social Constructivism” in John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (ed.) The 
Globalization of World Politics. An introduction to international relations. 4 ed. New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp.160-173, p.164-166 
35 Hardacre (2008), p.IX 
36 Roloff (2006), p.18 
37 Rüland (2002)  
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dialogue on all official levels, though the two blocs have not yet managed to reach a 
“comprehensive relationship”. A lot of work remains on coming to an agreement on the trade 
pillar. Rüland stresses that interregionalism is built on a low level of institutionalism, and that 
both blocs therefore rely on their own institutional infrastructure, while Roloff sees 
interregionalism as a process of deepening interactions between different regions.38 The 
various definitions of interregionalism are somehow different, or more fittingly, rather 
focusing on different aspects of the theory of interregionalism. While Hardacre focus on the 
more tangible aspect of interregionalism (but at the same time also highlights that 
interregionalism can be a “comprehensive relationship”), Roloff sees interregionalism as a 
process where there is a focus on how systemic pressures reinforce the dynamics of 
regionalism. The different aspects of Hardacre, Roloff and Rüland´s definitions will all be 
used in the analysis and discussion of the interregional relations between the EU and 
Mercosur.  
None of the definitions presented above manage to go deeper into explaining why 
states and/or international organizations decide to get involved in interregional relations with 
other states/organizations. This might be the very problem why there is not yet a clear 
definition of the term, as no school of theory alone can explain interregionalism. Many 
schools of theories are trying, but only manage to explain parts of why interregionalism 
evolves. One of the reasons why neither neorealism nor neoliberal institutionalism can 
satisfyingly explain international relations or interregionalism is because of the growing 
insight that international relations are neither only driven by power nor exclusively by 
cooperative motivations.39  
 
Rüland describes five major functions of interregionalism: balancing, institution building, 
rationalizing, agenda-setting, and collective identity-building.40 These functions will also be 
important in the further discussions of this thesis. 
Balancing is used to maintain or re-establish equilibrium among states. Such 
balancing games may take the form of “power balancing”, or “institutional balancing”.41 The 
power balancing describes a balancing if there is a military dimension, and an institutional 
balancing if the perceived disequilibria between regions are countered by interregional 
                                                        
38 Rüland (2002); Roloff (2006), p.18 
39 Hänggi et al. (2006), p.10 
40 Rüland (2006), p.300  
41 Rüland (2006), p.300 
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institution building or the activation of existing interregional forums.42 The latter one is close 
to what has been termed “cooperative balancing” and “competitive cooperation”. According 
to Rüland, the EU has triggered an “institutional balancing” through its single market and 
monetary union projects.43 Rüland mentions Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSFTA), all responses to the EU single market and monetary union. The social 
scientist Jörg Faust demonstrates that the EU-Mercosur relations have been a European 
response and closely linked to the US plans for a FTAA, and strategies by the US state and 
firms to invest in Latin America. 44 The Latin American countries, especially Brazil, have 
sought closer ties to Europe in order to reduce US influence.45 Interregionalism has been 
interpreted as one of the responses to “an increasingly complex world of interdependence” 
and “important shifts in relative power in the international system as a consequence of the 
demise of the Soviet Empire”.46  
 According to the realist school of international relations, interregionalism contributes 
to balancing. Examples of this could be balancing against the superior power in military, 
economic, financial and technological terms (for example the US). One can also balance 
against economic powers (for example of the EU or East Asia). From an institutionalist 
perspective, interregionalism is seen as a “vehicle to enhance “global governance”, i.e. to help 
manage both the opportunities and the risks inherent in the accelerating interdependence or 
“globalization” of international relations”.47  Interregionalism seen from a constructivist point 
of view would be a way to “help build and solidify regional collective identities”.48  
The institution building refers to institutions and have been defined as “an enduring set 
of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that shape the expectations, interests, and 
behavior of actors, make state behavior predictable, facilitate negotiated compromises, outlaw 
the illegitimate use of force, and this reduce the likelihood of interstate violence”. 49 
International institution-building is viewed by the liberal institutionalists as a “key to mitigate 
the anarchical character of international relations”. 50 Norms, rules and international 
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organizations are important institutions and are important in order to “legalize” international 
relations. International dialogues create a need for unified positions, and therefore intensified 
consultation and coordination.51  
The term rationalizing refers to the increasingly complex and technical policy matters 
that the global multilateral institutions have to contend to, and the growing number of actors 
that often represents very different interests. This is an obstacle to the multilateral decision-
making, and thereby reduces the efficiency of international forums and represents a threat to 
their legitimacy.52 The main idea of the rationalizing is that regional and interregional 
relations and dialogues may thus serve as “clearing houses for decision-making bottlenecks” 
in global multilateral forums. By first starting at the regional level, then the interregional 
level, instead of elevating directly to a global level, one might save time and prevent a 
paralysis of global institutions.53 
Agenda-setting, is closely related to the rationalizing function, and refers to when 
interregional institutions adopt agenda-setting means. This is in order for nation-states or 
regional groupings to instrumentalize interregional dialogues and advance policies or themes 
that at this point do not resonate in global forums. Most dialogue partners seek to confine 
political dialogues to a rather loose and non-committing exchange of information.54 By the 
signing of a FTA, the interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur will be tied closer 
together.  
The term collective identity-building refers to the more constructivist effect that 
interregional relations have. With the phrase “regionalism through regionalism” it is 
perceived that previous interactions of a region with another region (or states belonging to it) 
is reflected by interregional interaction. Rüland states that experiences and mental 
representation by political leaders will shape a region´s self-identity, its interest and role 
perception of the other region in international relations. The way other regional groupings 
perceive a regional grouping has an impact on its own view of itself, its perceptions of its role 
and its interests. Collective identity-building through interregional interactions might just as 
well be unintended as intended. If one group for example offers incentives to another to 
strengthen the cohesion of the latter, it is intentional. When a relationship is “perceived by 
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one side as a vehicle in the hands of the other to establish or consolidate superiority”, it is 
unintentional.55  
 
What is interregionalism? And how is interregionalism important in order to better understand 
the relationship between the European Union and Mercosur? Many theorists have tried to 
come up with a good definition of the term interregionalism. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, there is no common definition of the term, but the different definitions that have been 
discussed are somehow focusing on different aspects of the theory. Interregionalism can both 
be defined as a process (according to Roloff), a relationship like the one between the EU and 
Mercosur or a comprehensive relationship that covers deeper cooperation (according to 
Hardacre), or a group-to-group cooperation with a low level of institutionalism (according to 
Rüland).  
As both the EU and Mercosur are regional blocs that have decided to engage in 
negotiations with each other in order to cooperate even closer, the theory of interregionalism 
is a handy instrument in order to understand some of the reasons for the relationship, what lies 
behind such a relationship and the wish to negotiate an association/ free trade agreement. The 
theory of interregionalism will be a very useful tool in order to approach the relationship and 
understand the nature of it, as it approaches some of the factors that drive regional blocs in its 
search for cooperation and closer relationships with other regional blocs.  
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3. Background: The Relationship between the EU and Mercosur  
 
In light of the changes in the post-Cold War, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
established Mercosur through the Treaty of Asunción in 1991. The main motivation behind 
the foundation of Mercosur was to establish a common market modeled on the European 
Community (EC, later EU).56 As the Mercosur countries share close cultural and historical 
ties with some of the EU countries (Spain and Portugal in particular), the two regional blocs 
were in many ways “natural” partners. The EU and Mercosur formalized their interregional 
relations through the signing of the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework for Cooperation 
Agreement (EMIFCA) in Madrid 1995. In May 2000, the negotiations on an Association 
agreement, or what could eventually become the biggest FTA in the world, as well as the first 
FTA between customs unions were initiated/launched.57 Obstacles and difficulties have 
colored the rounds of negotiations, and even though state leaders from both blocs have 
expressed an interest in coming to an agreement, an agreement has not yet been reached 
between the two blocs. This chapter will outline the background for the negotiations as well 
as the rounds of negotiations until they stalled in 2004.  
Differences in negotiation culture and opposing views regarding trade, have posed 
obstacles to the rounds of negotiations. As Andy Klom argues, while the Mercosur 
negotiators used a “top-down approach that consisted of formal consensus on objectives at the 
highest level within a kind of ´framework´ agreement, leaving it to technical experts to flesh 
out troublesome details later on”, the EU approach was a more “down-top approach, where 
building agreements bottom-up on the basis of informal consensus on objectives”.58 Even 
though the negotiations officially stalled in 2004, the two blocs continued negotiations/the 
contact aiming at relaunching the negotiations at a later point of time.  
 
3.1 Mercosur – Mercado Común del Sur 
 
El Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), or Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul), was 
established through the Treaty of Asunción, March 26 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
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and Uruguay. Chile was added as an associate member in 1996, and Bolivia in 1997.59 Peru 
was added as an associate in 2003, Colombia and Ecuador in 2004.60 The purpose of the 
Asunción Treaty was the constitution of a Customs Union. The Treaty would assure the 
integration of the member states within a free trade zone through free circulation of goods, 
services and productive factors, and the establishment of an External Common Tariff (TEC). 
The treaty would also assure the adoption of a common commercial policy towards third 
states or groups of states, coordination of macro-economic, sectorial policies and 
harmonization of legislation in relevant areas affected by the Treaty.61 Mercosur is a political 
and economical project; the political defined by the democratic commitment of the 
participating countries, and the economic aiming at liberalization and commercial openness.62  
In the post-Cold War climate, collective approaches were favored in order to face the 
challenges of globalization and the end of the Cold-War bipolarity.63 While the European 
Economic Area (EEC) developed under the protection of NATO, Mercosur developed under 
post-Cold War conditions. Even though the Mercosur countries never experienced the horrors 
and tragedies of the European wars, which delegitimized nationalism, the Mercosur region did 
experience years of military dictatorships. The dictatorship in Paraguay ended as late as in 
1989.64 The history of rivalry between Argentina and Brazil had been long, and all of the 
original member countries had earlier suffered long totalitarian rules. To overcome these 
problems from the past, as well as fit into the new Post-Cold War world, the main focus of 
Mercosur became trade. The process has been profoundly political.65 This is mainly because 
Mercosur is aiming at reducing political instability in the region and making the ties and 
relations better among the member states.66 As Mercosur have no supranational organs, the 
relationship between the Mercosur members is mainly dependent on political will and contact 
between the countries.  
Mercosur has an intergovernmental nature and has no tripartite division of functions as 
found in many international organizations and modern democratic states. Though Mercosur 
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does not have this tripartite division of functions, the organization has several organs, guided 
by two essential goals; that of building and administering institutions (operational, 
prescriptive and coordination activities) and that of dispute settlement.67 The Treaty of 
Asunción laid a basis for how disputes between states should be addressed. Disputes will first 
be addressed through direct negotiations between the litigants, and next through action by the 
Common Market Group or the Common Market Council. In general it covers disputes 
between Mercosur´s member states, but through the Protocol of Brasilia, disputes between 
private persons and one of the member states can also be solved through the organs. Still, the 
Mercosur bodies´ administrative and prescriptive powers are limited, mostly to the 
organization itself, and they have little effective power over member countries. There is a rule 
of unanimity; this is what allows the member states to express a common will.68 
The Common Market Council (CMC – El Consejo del Mercado Común) and the 
Common Market Group (GMC – Grupo Mercado Común) are the principal organs of 
Mercosur. The Mercosur Trade Commission, and the Mercosur Administrative Secretariat 
assist the principal organs in their work. The CMC and the CMG have the main responsibility 
of the administration and execution of the Treaty of Asunción. The Protocol of Ouro Preto 
states that the Mercosur Trade Commission also has decision-making powers with the CMC 
and the GMC.69 
The highest organ of Mercosur is the Common Market Council. The CMC has the 
responsibility for Mercosur´s political leadership and for decision-making to ensure 
compliance with the objectives and time limits that are set for the final establishment of 
Mercosur/the common market.70 The CMC meets at two different levels, presidential and 
ministerial.71 When it meets at ministerial level, it consists of the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs and the Economic Ministers of the member states. The Council meets whenever its 
members deem appropriate, but the Protocol of Ouro Preto from 1994 requires that 
presidential meetings must be held every six months. The presidency of the Council rotates 
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among its members every six months. Even though the CMC is the highest executive body, it 
retains its character as a ministerial conference.72  
The Common Market Group is the permanent executive body, and is assisted by the 
Administrative Secretariat. The GMC has the power to delegate, in part, to subgroups.73 The 
GMC consists of four members and four alternates from each country that are appointed by 
their respective governments.74 Some of the GMC´s main tasks are to enforce decisions 
adopted by the CMC, coordinate macroeconomic policies, and to negotiate agreements with 
third parties.75 
The Mercosur Trade Commission is responsible for assisting the GMC and to monitor 
the application of the common trade policy instruments that have been agreed by the member 
states in connection with the operation of the customs union. The Trade Commission shall 
also follow up and review questions and issues that are related to common trade policies, 
intra-Mercosur trade and third countries.76 In addition to this there are also working groups, 
the Joint Parliamentary Group, Administrative Secretariat and the Judicial System. The 
Administrative Secretariat is located in Montevideo, Uruguay, and consists of official 
representatives from the member countries. The Judicial System is an ad-hoc arbitration 
committee that solves conflicts that cannot be solved within the intergovernmental 
framework. The Joint Parliamentary Committee is a representative body of the Mercosur 
states´ parliaments, and has sixteen members from each member state.77  
Mercosur is first and foremost seen as the first integration project generated by 
globalization.78 As both Argentina and Brazil were aware of the fact that it would be very 
difficult for developing nations to benefit from globalization on their own and overcome the 
economic and security challenges it brought, the two countries decided to overcome their 
history of rivalry and reconcile. The two Presidents Raúl Alfonsin (Argentina) and José 
Sarney (Brazil) led the political transition and the reconciliation of the two countries, 
something that was regarded as an underlying condition for democratic consolidation. This 
change in bilateral relations was fundamental in gaining international legitimacy for their 
fledgling democracies. The signing of the Asunción Treaty and the establishment of Mercosur 
was seen as a way of “establishing” democracy. According to the political scientist Álvaro 
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Vasconcelos, the way that Mercosur most resembled the European model, was a need felt by 
many states in South America in the end of the 1980s to overhaul the security concepts that 
were caused by the military regimes throughout many years of dictatorships, and consolidate 
their democratic structures.79  
 
3.2 The European Union 
 
Based on the Schuman Plan, Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Italy 
established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 through the Treaty of 
Rome. The ECSC later changed into a European Economic Community (EEC) (1957), and 
the European Community (EC) in 1967. The EC was changed to the European Union (EU) 
through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/93. Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC 
in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, 
the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia in 2004, and lastly Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
The EU has today the most advanced embodiment of supranational constitutionalism, 
meaning that the EU institutions can distribute and limit the power (with some exceptions) of 
the member states. This supranational constitutionalism was created as a response to secure 
the survival and reconstruction in the European States after the Second World War.80 
The underlying conditions in the two regions were very different. The EEC (later EC 
and finally EU), developed under the protection of the NATO, while Mercosur on the other 
hand developed under the conditions of the post-Cold War period as an embodiment of 
integration. Vasconcelos points out that there were many underlying conditions for the 
creation of the EC/EU. As a result of two worlds wars, there was disenchantment with 
national sovereignty, as well as specific conditions of the Cold War and the Soviet threat. The 
European integration was supported both politically and economically by the United States 
because of the Soviet threat.81  
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3.3 The road towards a closer relationship between the EU and Mercosur 
 
The EU and Latin America share a long common history. This common history is mainly tied 
to Spain and Portugal, and it comes as no surprise that Spain and Portugal´s incorporation into 
the EC in 1986 had an important role in the EC´s/EU´s focus on the Latin American region. 
For a long time the relationship between Europe and Latin America was on a country-to-
country bilateral basis. According to Hardacre, the relationship with Latin America had to 
bear a burden of neglect, frustrations, and missed opportunities, as the EC mainly focused on 
Africa, Greece and Turkey.82 A “Memo of Intention” was issued by the EC to Latin American 
governments between 1958 and 1963, wherein the EC declared that it was seeking close 
relations and cooperation with Latin America.83 The relations between the EC and Latin 
America advanced economically with the signing of non-preferential trade agreements 
between the EC and Argentina in 1971, Uruguay in 1973, Brazil in 1973 and Mexico in 1975. 
As almost all of the Latin American countries suffered under totalitarian dictatorships, the 
democratization process was a key factor to its entry into the multilateral world. Even though 
the EC and Latin America have had sporadic contact and relations, it was not really until the 
mid 1990s that the relationship took shape through the 1994 “Basic Document on relations 
between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean”.84  
In the beginning of the 1990s there was a shift in EC/EU policy towards Latin 
America. The post-Cold War world caused changes in international relations. The EU decided 
to move towards a closer relationship with Mexico, Chile and Mercosur through some form of 
associated status. Hitherto, this kind of associated status has been reserved for those states that 
historically or politically have been considered of top foreign policy priority status for the 
EU.85 There are different reasons for why the EC/EU decided to intensify the relations to 
Latin America; some of which will be discussed later on in this chapter. The end of the Cold 
War, a fear of a strong US influence and power in the region, as well as a fear of loosing 
markets, were among the main reasons why the EU decided to focus on Latin America.  
As Spain and Portugal always have had close ties to Latin America both historically 
and culturally, it is no surprise that these two member states pushed for a closer relationship 
with Mercosur and Mexico. It was during the Portuguese presidency in 1992, that the first 
informal ministerial meeting took place with the Mercosur countries, and under the Spanish 
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presidency of the Union that the EU-Mercosur framework agreement and the project for an 
interregional free trade area were launched.86  
The EMIFCA was signed at the end of the Spanish presidency in the EU Council, in 
Madrid in 1995 and entered into force in 1999.87 The signing of the EMIFCA was important 
to Spain for different reasons; the agreement was a milestone that was signed during the 
Spanish presidency; the agreement consolidated four years of political work that aimed at 
creating an integration process in South America, something that also in many ways reflected 
the same integration process that Spain had benefited from through the European integration 
process. Spain was focused on Europe for political and economical reasons, and focused on 
Latin America for cultural and historical reasons.88 One can therefore say that Spain´s main 
reason for tying Latin America closer to Europe and the EU are and were mainly cultural and 
historically rooted, though Spain also clearly had commercial interests as it became the 
number one European investor in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.89 From 1996 to 2000, Spain 
stood for USD 9608,4 million in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Mercosur region.90  
The EMIFCA outlines that both parties have “the political will […] to achieve what 
will ultimately be a political and economic interregional association founded on greater 
political cooperation and progressive and reciprocal liberalization of all trade, taking account 
of the sensitivity of certain goods and complying with World Trade Organization (WTO) 
rules, and founded, finally, on the promotion of investment and closer cooperation”.91 The 
basis for the political dialogue between the two blocs was outlined in a joint declaration 
annexed to the Agreement. This political dialogue takes place regularly at Heads of State, 
Ministerial and Senior Official levels.92 The key objective of the EMIFCA was to prepare the 
negotiations for a EU – Mercosur Interregional Association Agreement between the two blocs 
that would include a liberalization of trade goods and service, with the aim of free trade in 
conformity with WTO rules. In addition to this, it was aimed at an enhanced form of 
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cooperation as well as a strengthened political dialogue.93 This agreement is the foundation of 
the relation between the two blocs.  
One of EU´s main reasons to encourage closer ties with Mercosur was the fear that the 
US would expand its activism in the area. There were several initiatives that proved that the 
EU´s fear was reasonable; the Initiative of the Americas in 1990, the NAFTA in 1994, and the 
launch of the negotiations for a FTAA in 1999. The US and the EU has looked upon, and 
perceived Latin America differently. 94 While the US has considered the Latin American 
regional projects as merely temporary, the EU sees the Latin American regional projects as 
long term. It is therefore clear that there has been and still is a clear difference in how the EU 
and the US perceive Mercosur as a regional bloc, and not the least their belief in Latin 
America as a continent. The US has even tried to destabilize Mercosur, as it proposed that 
Argentina (under President Menem) should join the NAFTA. The US hoped that this would 
destabilize Mercosur, and that more Latin American countries would join the Agreement.95 
The EU and the USA have therefore also aimed at two different kinds of interregional 
relations with Mercosur. The EU aimed at developing a dialogue between regional groups and 
to make regional schemes stronger. The European objectives have been to conquer new 
markets, but just as important have been the ambition of exporting the EU´s model of 
governance and to create new alliances. This has been done in order to create new alliances to 
shape a less asymmetric world. The US strategy has been to create macro-economic areas in 
order for goods, services and capital to move freely as well as where other regional schemes 
have to dilute themselves into these areas. The US trade strategy is linked to a power strategy 
and is aiming to guarantee the supremacy of the US economy in the global economy.96  
Between 1998 and 2001, many of the South American countries faced economic crisis, 
which distanced them from Mercosur and made the negations harder. The Argentine crisis 
broke out for real December 2001, followed by the International Monetary Fund´s (IMF) 
decision to no longer extend loans to the country, despite the fact that Argentina for years had 
applied the IMF´s monetary and liberal policies. Argentina had since the end of the 1980s 
implemented the structural reform policies known as the “Washington Consensus”. The 
“Washington Consensus” puts a strong importance in opening up the economy to 
international competition and “the natural capacities of markets to guarantee stability and 
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growth”.97 The Washington Consensus is a set of ten neo-liberal policies that, according to the 
US government and the international financial institutions based in the US capital, were 
necessary elements in order to increase economic growth.98 The government of Carlos 
Menem (Argentine president from 1989-1999) decided that Argentina was going to be one of 
the USA´s most important allies in South America, with the strategy to safeguard the opening 
of the economy. Before the presidency of Menem, Argentina´s foreign policy had mostly built 
on principles that underlined the importance of “territory, military balance of power, the 
power of the state and “autonomy” as the ultimate goal of foreign policy and national 
security”.99 Argentina had long sought to become a regional power, but this strategy was 
questioned during and after the Argentine dictatorship between 1976 until 1983. The first 
democratically elected government decided to strengthen the ties with Brazil and Chile, and 
these were the first steps towards the establishment of Mercosur. But when Menem arrived in 
office there was a hyperinflation in Argentina, and Argentina entered a “dollarization” 
process and aligned the Argentine foreign policy with that of Washington/the US. The US 
tried to use this situation to destabilize the Argentine-Brazilian relation that was developed 
through Mercosur. The US did further what it could to destabilize Mercosur, and even 
proposed to sign bilateral trade agreements with Argentina during the Fernando De la Rúa 
government in Argentina (1999 - December 1, 2001).100 
The FTAA was and is an effort to unite the economies of the Americas into a single 
free trade area. The process began in 1994, with the Summit of the Americas that was held in 
1994, but the negotiations were formally launched in 1998. The FTAA was to involve all 
countries in the Americas but Cuba. In the second round of FTAA negotiation that was held 
in Cartagena in March 1996, it was agreed that the FTAA Agreement would be a “balanced, 
comprehensive, WTO-consistent agreement that would constitute a single undertaking”.101 
The FTAA negotiations stalled in 2005.102  
According to Doctor, peaks in EU negotiating seriousness tended to coincide with 
peaks in perceived US influence in the region.103 One of the EU´s motivations behind tying a 
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closer relationship to the Mercosur countries has also been to export its institutional models 
with the preference for supporting liberal democracy, market economies with liberal 
economic governance structures and inter-regionalism as a framework for international co-
operation.104 Mercosur also used the EU-Mercosur negotiations to counter-balance US 
influence in the region and enhance Mercosur´s position in other regional and multilateral 
fora.105 While the Mercosur countries were still negotiating a FTAA, it was important to 
especially Brazil to keep these negotiations close to the EU-Mercosur negotiations, as this 
would put pressure on the EU and then possibly make the deal better for Mercosur. Especially 
Brazil used Mercosur as a political and economic alliance to confront these powers (USA 
through the FTAA negotiations, and the EU through the EU-Mercosur negotiations). The 
FTAA negotiations thus had an important impact on the EU-Mercosur negotiations.106  
The EU offered and provided political, technical and financial support for institution 
building in Mercosur, as it wanted to establish a regional integration in Latin America, based 
on European models.107 Through the Ouro Preto Protocol in 1994, Mercosur extended its 
treaties, so that it could act as a single entity. The establishment of Mercosur and its signing 
of various treaties had a psychological effect, as foreign investment increased in the Mercosur 
countries.108 As the EU was used as, and considered a model for Mercosur, it was important 
for the Mercosur countries to have close relations to the EU in order to strengthen their own 
regionalism.109 If Mercosur sign an inter-regional agreement with the EU, this could 
accelerate the intra-regional integration process as well as serve as an impetus of 
consolidating Mercosur.110 
After the signing of the EMIFCA in 1995, the two blocs started to prepare its 
successor agreement. Discussions on a draft began early in 1998. The EU strongly supported 
the integration and the common market of Mercosur, as the EU wanted to strengthen its 
relation to Mercosur as a bloc and not as four individual countries.111 The EU and Mercosur 
had intensive negotiations in Buenos Aires in 1998, which laid the basis for a joint text. The 
“photography”, or text, was finalized and submitted in 1998. On the basis of the photography 
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report, the European Commission made an impact study, and then afterwards prepared a draft 
text for negotiating directives. Before the draft text could be submitted to the Council of 
Ministers, it had to be approved by the European Commission. 112 In order to start the 
negotiations with Mercosur, the European Commission needed a negotiation mandate from 
the Council. There were major differences between the Council´s members, as some meant 
that a free trade area with Mercosur would harm the European agricultural sector. The French, 
Irish and Dutch ministers of agriculture and fisheries were especially opposed to this mandate 
under strong pressure from their domestic lobbies. The UK meant that the EU should not start 
any negotiations with Mercosur before the end of the following WTO round. The European 
agricultural lobby, Copa-Cogeca also supported the countries opposed to the negotiations as 
they were against any kind of trade agreement with Mercosur. The opposing parts managed to 
reach a compromise, which gave the Commission a mandate to start the negotiations with 
Mercosur on non-tariff barriers, but that delayed any discussion on customs duties until July 
2001. The discussion could and should not be completed before the WTO round.113  
There were various important events that put pressure on the EU to hurry up, as a EU 
summit in Berlin in March 1999 would be deciding on reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), and a EU-Latin America summit would take place in June 1999 in Rio de 
Janeiro that could help launch the EU-Mercosur negotiations to include free trade. The WTO 
round also started in November 1999 in Seattle. After a heated debate, the Commission 
approved the negotiating directives and the impact study; the majority wanted to go ahead 
with the association negotiations with Mercosur. Even though the Council initially was 
unenthusiastic towards the Commission´s decision to propose negotiations, the Council 
decided to give the Commission green light to go ahead with the negotiations, as rejecting it 
would damage the relations with Mercosur. According Andy Klom, if one would reject the 
Commission´s proposals one would damage relations with Mercosur, but one could also 
damage relations with Mercosur if neutering the proposals and rendering the free trade 
elements ineffective. To adopt the proposals without any objections could create unacceptable 
costs for some members. The preferences in the EU were somehow divided between those 
groups that preferred multilateral trade negotiations instead of regional negotiations with 
Mercosur. As the WTO round was under negotiation, it was not known if this could allow for 
greater gains and compensations to be obtained. The preferences varied from postponing the 
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negotiations between the EU and Mercosur until the WTO negotiations had been concluded to 
being skeptical to any free trade discussion.114 
The EU summit in Berlin 1999 failed to bring about a CAP reform, when France 
outflanked the German presidency. The EU was also struck by scandal as the Santer European 
Commission (January 1995 – March 1999), had to resign due to corruption.115 In 2000 the EU 
and Mercosur opened negotiations for an Association Agreement that included three chapters: 
political dialogue, cooperation and trade.116 The parties created three technical groups. The 
first group was dedicated to trade in goods, cover tariff and non-tariff measures, rules of 
origin, technical standards, trade protection measures and customs questions. The second 
technical group was dedicated to trade in services, intellectual property rights and investment. 
The third technical group was dedicated to public procurement, competition issues and 
dispute resolution.117   
The negotiations between the EU and Mercosur mainly took, and still take place 
within the EU-Mercosur Bi-regional Negotiations Committee (BNC), a Subcommittee on Co-
operation (SCC), that was going to conduct negotiations related to the topic of cooperation, a 
Coordination Department that was composed of representatives of the Mercosur´s Presidency 
and the European Commission as well as several Technical Groups (TG) dealing with trade 
matters assigned through the trade negotiations between the EU and Mercosur.118 The BNC is 
responsible for the creation of technical groups and to implement activities related to trade 
negotiations.119   
 The dialogue between the parties takes place regularly at Heads of State, Ministerial 
and Senior Official levels. The basis for the political dialogues is found in a joint declaration 
annexed to the Agreement.120 From April 2000 until October 2004, there were 15 rounds of 
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur. These negotiations were lead by the BNC, which 
consists of delegates from the two blocs, and were held three times a year. The BNC delegates 
from the EU were appointed from the EU Commission and the EU delegation in Argentina, 
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while the Mercosur BNC-delegates were appointed from various governmental organs.121 In 
these negotiations the main focus has been on trade issues. Other key issues have been to 
identify obstacles and objectives, exchange of technical data, co-operation and non-tariff trade 
issues, trade and investment rules, etc. Attempts to finalize the negotiations were also made, 
but the negotiations broke down in 2004. In addition, the SCC met regularly to deal with a 
range of other issues including institutional support, customs harmonization, technical norms 
and standards, statistical harmonization, veterinary and phytosanitary rules and support for 
civil society organizations.122  
 
3.4 The Agricultural Sector; A sector bound to disagreements 
 
One of the main issues in the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur is the agricultural 
sector. Mercosur is one of the biggest agricultural producers in the world, while the EU on the 
other hand is faced with heavy pressures to protect this sector in Europe.123 As the Mercosur 
agricultural sector is more competitive than the EU one, as well as it would be able to develop 
faster, the agricultural sector in the EU clearly opposes an agreement that could hurt them 
economically.124 The agricultural sector still continues to be the most important economic 
sector in some of the rural parts of the EU. France, Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK account 
for big parts of the agricultural value, and are as well representing some of the countries 
where the skepticism towards an agreement is stronger. The agricultural sector is a very 
central component in the economies of the Mercosur member states. This sector actually 
represents about 10% of the GDP of several of its member states, and the sector is growing. 
The EU fears the competitive and modern agricultural sector in Mercosur.125  
Mercosur want the EU to eliminate CAP barriers and subsidies, which are harming the 
Mercosur agricultural goods. Mercosur is interested in the EU agriculture market, while the 
EU is more interested in the Mercosur car, industrial and service markets. This shows that 
there is a strong North-South component to the EU-Mercosur negotiations. These different 
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interests could make the relationship more complementary, but both blocs are resisting in 
opening up their markets, as they both fear the other one´s stronger competition.126  
As Mercosur is a lot more competitive than the EU when it comes to agricultural 
products, the farm and agri-business interest groups within the EU lobbied hard against the 
inter-regional negotiations between the EU and Mercosur as this posed a clear threat. They 
have argued that negotiations with Mercosur harm the CAP. When their arguments did not 
lead anywhere, they have done what they can to obstruct the progress in negotiations 
whenever possible, by arguing that negotiations with Mercosur would have a very negative 
effect on EU reform agendas (especially with respect to CAP), as well as overloading the 
multilateral trade. One can also say that they have succeeded in delaying the signing of any 
agreement that would give Mercosur freer access to the European market. On the Mercosur 
side, the agricultural interests have demanded that the EU guarantee market access for their 
products. As Mercosur´s market has grown (especially in Asia), the demand has become less 
insistent. Regionally organized businesses, including agri-businesses, were the most active 
societal actors engaged in the political bargaining process, whether pushing for market 
opening or seeking to maintain protectionist policies. The industrial and service sectors within 
the EU that would gain from better access to Mercosur markets, lobbied for an agreement that 
would open up the markets. The manufacturing and service sector in Mercosur were more 
hesitant about a further liberalization of the markets, but at the same time they knew that more 
FDI would contribute to an upgrading of the competitiveness of regional exports.127 Doctor 
describes that there was a careful balancing of benefits on offer with the concessions they 
were expected to make. The Mercosur governments were eager to get a greater access of their 
agricultural goods in the EU markets, as well as eager to attract more EU investment. This 
balancing of benefits is a typical realist position.128 
 
3.5 The EU-Mercosur Rounds of Negotiation from 2000 – 2004 
 
The first round of negotiations was held at the level of the BNC in Buenos Aires in April 
2000.129 The negotiators reached conclusions on general principles, political dialogue, co-
operation and trade matters. Even though the two parties managed to reach some conclusions, 
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it was during this meeting revealed that the Argentine negotiators especially aimed at a 
general framework in the short term, where they would fill in the details later, while the EU 
aimed at a general framework in the long term, and wanted to make the first phase until July 
2001 us useful as possible.130 Already at this early stage in the negotiations, there was a clear 
sign of differences in negotiation culture and how to approach the negotiations, which would 
be an important obstacle for the negotiations to come. Growing trade tensions and differences 
in negotiating made the negotiations harder. The Mercosur negotiators made negative public 
statements about the so-called “EU unwillingness to negotiate”.131 The EU team consisted in 
general of highly specialized technical experts, while the Mercosur negotiators were mainly 
high-level officials and politicians that were not as acquainted with the details of negotiations. 
As also mentioned in the introduction, the Mercosur negotiators used a “top-down approach 
that consisted of formal consensus on objectives at the highest level within a kind of 
´framework´ agreement, leaving it to technical experts to flesh out troublesome details later 
on”, while the EU approach towards the negotiations was a more “down-top approach, where 
building agreements bottom-up on the basis of informal consensus on objectives”.132 
The second negotiation was held in Brussels in June 2000. Mercosur presented a 
proposal with specific objectives for each of the areas of the working groups and the EU 
presented an initial list of non-tariff barriers in order to identify barriers to trade.133 
Information was exchanged on the CAP, the enlargement of the EU, on the progress of the 
integration of Mercosur and the Mercosur association agreements with Chile and Bolivia. 
When the third negotiation process started in Brasilia November 2000, Brazil was aiming to 
better the climate of the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur, as there was a growing 
trade tension. Technical expert negotiators from Mercosur engaged in lengthy discussions 
with the EU counterparts, something that resulted in a positive atmosphere and a step forward 
in the negotiations. The exchange of information continued and discussions around the 
specific objectives started. This discussion did however not advance, because the EU wanted 
a more pragmatic dialogue. The exchange of information went more smoothly in those areas 
that did not represent any difficulties for the future negotiations.134 
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The fourth negotiation was held in Brussels in March 2001, and here previously 
presented documents were considered. During the fourth round of negotiation, progress was 
made in issues concerning competition policy, intellectual property rights, public 
procurement, and dispute settlement. Mercosur faced hard internal tensions in this time that 
also affected the negotiations, especially when Domingo Cavallo was appointed the new 
Argentine economics minister. Cavallo wanted to transform Mercosur into a free trade area 
and then allowing Argentina to negotiate its own agreements with external partners. This did 
put a pressure on the internal dynamics of Mercosur.135 The internal conflicts within Mercosur 
at the time affected the negotiations in a way that made it harder to focus on actually making a 
step closer to reach an agreement. As mentioned in the introduction, an issue that caused 
problems between the two blocs was the way of approaching the negotiations. The EU 
Commission has negotiated numerous regional agreements upon one method/matrix. The 
negotiators from the Mercosur countries saw that their proposed methods were rejected by the 
European negotiators with the same argument: that the EU had multiple agreements and could 
not design separate rules for each case. The Mercosur countries interpreted this as a lack of 
will and understanding from the EU to understand their interests. The EU has seen their way 
of approaching the negotiations the best possible way, while Mercosur wanted to discuss 
alternative ways of approaching the different positions.136 This discussion around the methods 
and modalities has been a returning obstacle in the negotiations. Through the negotiations it 
seems like the Mercosur negotiators have used the argument of lack of common agreed upon 
methods as an obstacle, or even “excuse” to prevent the negotiations from moving forward. 
Whether this is a difference in negotiating culture, a need of Mercosur to make their voice 
heard, internal problems or other disagreements, is hard to predict. The feeling of being 
overrun by the more “experienced” or even “arrogant” European negotiators might be one 
reason, something that became clearer before the fifth negotiation round in Montevideo July 
2001. In this new round, the EU negotiators wanted to accelerate negotiations and exchange 
offers on tariffs and services. From Mercosur´s perspective the EU presented, in a unilateral 
way, a tariff offer and negotiation texts covering goods, services and governmental purchases. 
From the European perspective, Mercosur was not able or willing to present a counter-offer, 
and wanted to delay the progress by discussing methodology. This was mainly because of 
Argentina not being able, and Brazil not willing. From Mercosur´s perspective, they were not 
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able to present their trade offer due to the lack of an agreement on methods and modalities of 
the negotiation. Again the excuse of a lacking agreement on methods and modalities were 
used as an excuse to drag out the negotiations, but thanks to good work of the Uruguayan 
presidency of Mercosur, the negotiation did have a positive outcome. The EU managed to 
present a negotiation offer, while Mercosur was supposed to do the same in October that same 
year. The EU presented a negotiation offer covering 90 per cent of agricultural trade and 100 
per cent of industrial trade. The acceleration of the EU-Mercosur negotiations caught the 
Brazilian industry off guard. The EU also made it clear that if the negotiations were to break 
down, the EU would not sign a trade agreement with an individual country. This is a good 
example of how the EU and Mercosur were not really “equal” partners or that there were clear 
differences between the EU and Mercosur, and their bargaining power. As described earlier in 
this chapter, the political scientist Sebastian Santander mentions how the trade structure 
between the EU and Mercosur bears a strong resemblance to a North-South relation.137  
During the sixth negotiation in Brussels, October 2001, the presentation of Mercosur´s 
commercial offer was the main objective.138 Mercosur only presented a limited counter-offer, 
with the same excuse of the lack of an agreement on methods and modalities. The offer only 
covered around a third of the EU-Mercosur trade, and it fell short of WTO standards as well. 
As the Mercosur countries did face hard times both economically and politically, the offer 
was still seen as significant in symbolic terms. Argentina was especially badly struck by the 
financial crisis. In December 2001, riots and political turmoil in Argentina was broadcasted to 
the whole world. The situation was grave, and as the world economy situation worsened 
during 2002 the negotiations had to be more realistic about the ambitions for the short term.139  
The seventh negotiation round in Buenos Aires April 2002 was of limited technical 
nature.140 The trade negotiation was pending and no date was set to resume it. While the deals 
represented similar proportions of historical trade flows, the EU insisted that the Mercosur 
offer was insufficient regarding coverage, because it reached 90% of the value of trade and 
also rejected the conditionalities attached. Meanwhile, Mercosur on its side considered that 
fulfillment of these conditionalities were necessary for the European offer to mean a 
substantial improvement in market access. The conditionalities of the European offer ignored 
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the structural differences between the two blocs, and did not include elements of special and 
differential treatment for Mercosur. In sectors where Mercosur had a better chance of 
competing with EU production demands (textiles and footwear), strict reciprocal treatment 
was claimed by the EU, or did not grant significant improvement of access when it came to 
the agriculture sector.141 
The eight round of negotiation was held in Brasilia, November 2002. The agenda was 
set to the completion of methods and modalities for negotiating market access for goods, 
including agricultural products, and a definition of methods and modalities for the negotiation 
of services. During these negotiations the parties did come to an agreement on these 
methodological issues.142  
At the ninth negotiation in Brussels, March 2003, the central debate was centered on 
the revised offers that had been exchanged a few weeks earlier.143 During the tenth 
negotiation that was held in Asunción in June 2003, Mercosur decided to not present a revised 
offer on public procurement because there had not been an agreement on the methods and 
modalities for the negotiation in this area, and they waited for a better offer and conditions on 
the access to the community market for goods. The EU Commission responded by 
withholding its own bid on government procurement. Again a basic disagreement in methods 
and modalities colored the negotiations and was once again the formal obstacle.144 In the 
eleventh negotiation that was held in Brussels in the end of 2003, offers were not even 
included in the agenda.145 In November 2003, the European executive drew up the so-called 
“Brussels Programme”. This was an ambitious working plan that set out five negotiating 
sessions and two ministerial meetings before 2004, with the goal to reach and conclude the 
Association Agreement with Mercosur.146  
The twelfth negotiation was held in Buenos Aires in March 2004, and the thirteenth 
round of negotiations in Brussels in May 2004, a couple of days before the date for the 
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exchange of improved offers were set.147 Both parties referred to their expectations and the 
discussion revolved around how to estimate the values of the offers so far. The EU 
Commission orally described possible improvements of their offer without presenting 
anything written, which was more than what was offered in July 2001. In May the two blocs 
exchanged the last version of improved offers, with the goal to complete negotiations in 
October 2004 in Brussels. The offers were carefully studied, but were not sufficient for the 
blocs to continue negotiations and come to an agreement in October 2004 as planned.148 In 
May 2004, the EU also faced its biggest enlargement ever, as ten new member countries were 
implemented in the Union. The former Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade), in the 
European Commission, commissioner Pascal Lamy, asserted before the EU enlargement that 
this would not have any influence on the process of the EU-Mercosur negotiations. The great 
enlargement of the EU set the number of EU states at 25.149   
 
 From the perspective of Mercosur there was an imbalance between the different offers, 
which made it impossible to continue the negotiations. In the Ministerial meeting in Lisbon in 
October 2004, the ministers publically announced the priority of the strategic relation between 
the two regions and the Association agreement to reinforce the economic, political and 
commercial ties. In December 2004 the coordinators from both regions met in Río de Janeiro 
and tried to identify some of the negotiation´s obstacles. In March 2005, the coordinators met 
again in Brussels where they tried to define the starting point to relaunch the negotiations.150  
 
3.6 The stalling of the negotiations 
 
Doctor describes three imbalances that emerged to hinder progress in signing an inter-regional 
trade and investment agreement between the EU and Mercosur.151 These imbalances lay in 
conflicts arising from differences in 1) state and societal interests in each region; 2) the 
distribution of producer gains and losses; 3) the relative importance of each region for the 
other´s trade flows. The Europeans wanted to liberalize industrial products, but feared wider 
and greater liberalization in agricultural trade/ products. The South Americans on the other 
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hand wanted greater access to the European market and wanted less EU intervention in the 
agricultural sector. Imbalances between the two trading blocs made the negotiations more 
difficult, and made, how it seems, the blocs less and less eager to bother with signing an 
agreement.152 While the EU was (and still is) Mercosur´s most important trading partner, 
Mercosur was not as important to the EU, and the negotiation status was therefore also 
uneven. This was made clear through the rounds of negotiations, as the EU in a greater extent 
could “threaten” Mercosur; an example of this is how the EU clearly stated that it would not 
sign any bilateral agreements if an agreement between the two blocs were to fail. In 
commercial terms, the two blocs did not share the same motivations and “sense of urgency to 
reach an agreement”.153  
The negotiations between the EU and Mercosur stalled in 2004 for many reasons, 
which will be discussed more thoroughly in the next chapter. Still, one can probably say that 
the main reason for the suspension of the negotiations in 2004 was because of fundamental 
differences in the trade chapter. It is also important to take note of the different internal and 
external problems in and between the member countries under consideration.  
Even though the main negotiations between the EU and Mercosur were suspended, the 
political relations continued.154 The negotiations between the EU and Mercosur had in many 
ways come far by 2004, and the two blocs were ready to envisage a conclusion of 
negotiations, but it was decided in October 2004 that the offers on the table were not 
sufficiently ambitious, especially in the agricultural and service sector.155  
When the EU and Mercosur started the negotiations, there was an optimism that the 
two blocs would be able to sign an Association Agreement that would eventually lead to a 
FTA. The difference in negotiation culture between the two blocs should possibly have been 
treated at an early stage in order to make the rounds of negotiations go more smoothly, as the 
tendency through the different rounds of negotiations showed that a lot of time was spent, or 
even “wasted” discussing methods and modalities instead of actually focusing on the trade 
offers. This should be seen in light of the shifting context, as this obstacle also seems to have 
been used as a tactic by some of the countries. Through the different rounds of negotiations 
Mercosur in particular seems to have used the excuse for lacking agreements on the methods 
and modalities in order to drag out the negotiations. Brazil especially seems to have played 
strategically by working hard to keep the negotiations with the FTAA close to the 
                                                        
152 Doctor (2007), p.297 
153 Santander (2002), p.499; Santander (2005), p.298 
154 Doctor (2007), p.307-308 
155 Kirkpatrick et al. (2009), p.10 
 43
negotiations with the EU, in order to put pressure on the different negotiations. The EU feared 
that the US would get a stronger hold of Latin America, and this way tried to balance the 
power of the US. The FTAA negotiations might have stimulated the EU to try even harder to 
meet the needs and wishes of the Mercosur countries. Other general factors such as the terror 
attack on the US 9/11 might also have had an impact, as much of the US´ attention moved 
towards the middle East/Asia. This shift of interest in US foreign policy towards Latin 
America had its impacts on the EU´s interest in hurrying into coming to an agreement with 
Mercosur.156 When the US interest in Latin America decreased as the US shifted their focus to 
the Middle East after the 9/11 attacks, the need for the EU to rush an agreement slowly 
changed. If one of the EU´s main interests of reaching an Association or a FTA with 
Mercosur was to balance the US power, or make sure that the US would not get “a hold” of 
Latin America, the stalling of the negotiations are rather understandable or even logical as the 
US influence and activity was diminishing.  
Through the work of Klom and Molle, two rather different views of the negotiations 
are presented.157 While Klom is more skeptical, and maybe even seems to put some of the 
blame on the Mercosur countries for not coming to an agreement, Molle is talking the case for 
Mercosur. It is clear that Klom and Molle each represent one side in their discussions, or even 
rather the general views that can be found in each of the two blocs. This can also be put as 
another example of the difference between the EU and Mercosur that makes the negotiations 
even harder; the difference in approaching the negotiations and the issues and obstacles. The 
reason for this might be many things, but one factor is the general differences between the 
two blocs. While the EU consists of developed countries, Mercosur is formed by less 
developed countries. Another important difference is the degree of institutionalism within the 
two customs unions. The two blocs display a different degree of institutionalism, while the 
EU represents a very high degree of institutionalism and harmonization of rules. Mercosur 
represents only a low level of institutionalism.158 
 In order to better understand the interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur, 
the theory of interregionalism is a very important tool. The post-Cold War area created in 
many ways a new world order, and there was a clear expansion of regionalism and 
globalization. According to the theory of interregionalism, this created a need to 
institutionalize at a new level of international relations. As the world has been closer tied 
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together by globalization, the world has also been tied together through regionalism. 
Interregionalism has been a way of handling this new world situation.159 It is within this 
understanding of the theory of interregionalism that the interregional relations between the 
EU and Mercosur will be discussed and analyzed in the next chapters. 
 Even though the official negotiations stalled in 2004, representatives from the EU and 
Mercosur still met in order to try to relaunch the negotiations.160 One can probably say that 
the interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur just went into a different phase 
between 2004 and 2010. From a neorealist perspective, the EU wanted to balance its power 
towards the US influence in the region, and they were therefore very eager to come to an 
agreement with Mercosur before the FTAA would become a reality. Seen from an 
institutionalist perspective one of the most important parts of the negotiations was the actual 
creation and development of cooperation.161 If one sees the relations and negotiations between 
the two from a constructivist point of view, the creation and development of identities on the 
behalf of the regional cooperation has been important. As the EU worked as an “external 
federator”, it is interesting to see how much time and effort the EU put on Mercosur and Latin 
America, in order to “secure the EU way” being implemented in the Mercosur region.  
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4. The Trade Negotiations between the European Union and Mercosur 
from 2010 
 
On May 4 2010, the EU and Mercosur decided to relaunch the negotiations that had lain 
dormant since 2004. Nine rounds of negotiation have taken place since then. The negotiations 
were officially reinitiated at the EU-Mercosur summit in Madrid May 17 2010, and the first 
round of negotiations was held July 2 2010 in Buenos Aires.162 The objective of the 
negotiations is to negotiate a comprehensive trade agreement, not only covering trade in 
industrial and agricultural goods, but also services, improvement of rules on government 
procurement, intellectual property, customs and trade facilitation, and technical barriers to 
trade. The rounds have mainly focused on the part of the agreement related to rules. 163 The 
negotiations would follow the general principles and objectives that were established by the 
two blocs during the first BNC in Buenos Aires, 2000.164 Both the EU and Mercosur are still 
working on their market access offers – no date has yet been set for the exchange of these 
offers, though the plan is to exchange offers towards the end of 2013.165  
 
In this chapter these negotiations will be further discussed and analyzed, and the main 
questions of this thesis will be studied more thoroughly. What kind of difficulties and 
obstacles are the hardest for the EU and Mercosur to overcome? How has the relationship 
between the EU and Mercosur evolved, why did and do the two blocs want to negotiate, and 
why have the two blocs not yet been able to sign a EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement / 
Association Agreement?  
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4.1 The Relaunch of the negotiations 
 
“We relaunched the negotiations because we are quite convinced we can make them lead to 
an ambitious, balanced, association agreement,"  
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission.166 
 
EU Commission President, José Manuel Barroso´s statement and positive attitude towards the 
relaunch of the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur shows that there was a strong 
belief that the two blocs would be able to come to an agreement when the negotiations were 
relaunched. There was a general positivity and new belief in a EU-Mercosur Association 
agreement as the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur were officially relaunched at the 
EU-Mercosur summit in Madrid, 17 May 2010.167 Barroso stressed the importance of getting 
the economy in the right direction after the downturn in the global economy, and therefore 
how important it would be to seize the opportunity of opening the negotiations with Mercosur 
and strive to reach an agreement. Such an agreement would strengthen the global economy, 
and would offer benefits for both the EU and Mercosur in form of jobs and economic 
growth.168 On an initiative from the Spanish presidency of the EU and the Argentine 
Presidency of Mercosur, and a decision of the EU Commission College, the rounds of 
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur were therefore officially reinitiated.169 If the two 
blocs manage to come to an agreement, the accord would encompass 750 million people and 
USD 130 billion of annual trade.170  
The two blocs have put an emphasis on “balance” as in a “balanced agreement”, while 
discussing a future agreement. The negotiations between the EU and Mercosur stalled in 2004 
as a consequence of that the two blocs did not manage to come to an agreement when neither 
one could accept the other´s offers. One could therefore see this emphasis on a “balanced 
agreement” as a focus that both parties make on coming to an agreement that both parties will 
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be comfortable with and from which both parties will be able to benefit. 
 The main objective of the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur is to reach an 
Association Agreement that would deepen the political relations and cooperation and to 
eventually reach a FTA. Another aspect of particular interest to the Mercosur is improved 
access of agricultural products to the EU market. The reforms of the CAP in 1998 and 2003 
are not termed as sufficient to the liberalization and are of specific interest to Mercosur.171 
The agricultural sector is still going to be one of the biggest obstacles on the roads towards an 
agreement. The agricultural sector in the EU has especially stressed that an agreement 
between the EU and Mercosur would have a negative impact, or as Copa-Cogeca (“The 
united voice of farmers and their co-operatives in the European Union”) describes it; “a 
devastating impact” on EU agriculture. Copa-Cogeca is naturally opposed to a trade 
agreement between the EU and Mercosur, and stresses that the EU already imports an 
equivalent of 35 million hectares of agricultural products, mostly and mainly from the 
Mercosur countries. An agreement would accentuate this dependency.172 
 
After the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur stalled in 2004, and until the relaunch of 
the negotiations in 2010, various events that would have a potential impact on the future 
negotiations emerged. The EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the world financial crisis, and 
internal problems in the two blocs (which will be discussed later on in this chapter), were 
among some of the problems that posed obstacles to the rounds and negotiations and made the 
negotiation climate harder, both within and between the two blocs. The EU has especially 
faced hard times due to the Euro-crisis. As the Uruguayan President José Mujica expressed, 
“El Mercosur anda mal, pero la UE anda peor” (Mercosur is doing bad, but the EU is doing 
worse).173 Many Europeans have migrated and are still migrating to Latin America and the 
Mercosur region in search of jobs and to escape the Euro-crisis.174 This also shows a shift in 
former power and strength. While the EU had a much stronger position in the negotiations 
before they stalled, the EU did relaunch the negotiations with Mercosur as a weaker union, as 
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it was struck by the financial crisis. Though the EU is still considered the stronger part, their 
clear stronger negotiation position has been weakened. 
The EU had also been enlarged with 12 new member states since the negotiations 
stalled. The EU´s Eastern Enlargement took place in May 2004, and this caused the EU to, in 
a greater extent, shift their focus towards the East.175 The enlargement in 2007 took the 
number to 27 EU member states. The financial crisis took hold of the developed world shortly 
after, and posed great challenges to the international economy. Europe has still not been able 
to solve the problems related to the financial crisis. The WTO Doha Round also reached a 
climax in 2008.176   
Mercosur has also had some intra-bloc problems as Argentina and Uruguay clashed 
over Uruguay´s plan to build two large pulp mills along the border between the two countries 
in 2006. This was the biggest foreign investment Uruguay had ever attracted, and 
understandably important to the country. Argentina fought the building of the pulp mills on 
the basis of fear of pollution and the negative impact the mills would have on both fishing and 
tourism. The matter went as far as to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where the Court 
ruled in favor of Uruguay.177 Angry over the pulp mill disagreement with Argentina, Uruguay 
went as far as signing a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United 
States. This agreement set the stage for “future trade liberalization and economic relations 
with the United States”. If Uruguay goes as far as signing a Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States, this would violate Mercosur´s charter, which strictly forbids bilateral 
agreements with nonmember countries.178  
Another challenge for Mercosur is the question of Bolivian full membership. Today, 
Bolivia is an associate member. If Bolivia is to join Mercosur as a full member, this might 
pose some problems, especially as Bolivia´s president Evo Morales has criticized Mercosur, 
saying “what I´ve discovered is that the CAN [Andean Community of Nations] as well as 
Mercosur are tools that only benefit businessmen and wealthy people, instead of the poor 
people”.179 Another problem that would be problematic if Bolivia was to join Mercosur is the 
case of the Bolivian tariffs, as they are lower than those of Mercosur. This would basically 
mean that Bolivia would have to increase those tariffs in order to join, which again would 
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have a significant impact on prices within Bolivia. If Mercosur were to grant exemptions, this 
would again be a problem to Uruguay and Paraguay, which were refused similar exemptions. 
Augustin Cornejo of the Institute for International Economics in the Wall Street Journal 
questions this with “can Mercosur keep a straight face in exceptions to the common external 
tariff, but say it´s not OK for Uruguay and Paraguay to negotiate a bilateral free trade 
agreement with the United States, since that would undermine the common tariff?”180 This is 
an important question, and the way Mercosur solves this question could have an important 
impact on the bloc´s future.  
 
These different events have naturally had their impacts on the negotiation climate between the 
EU and Mercosur. By not only taking the inter-bloc issues, but also the large amount of intra-
bloc issues under consideration, it is understandable that the negotiators from the two blocs 
have had their share of problems to overcome in order to reach an agreement. 
 
4.2 The Rounds of Negotiation after the relaunch in 2010 
 
The first round of negotiation was held June 29 to July 2, 2010, in Buenos Aires. Delegates 
from the EU and Mercosur met to relaunch the talks on the three pillars – political dialogue, 
cooperation and trade – of the future Association Agreement between the two blocs. The 
delegations were welcomed by the Argentine National Coordinator of the Common Market 
Group, Ambassador Alfredo Chiaradia, on behalf of the Pro Tempore Presidency of 
Mercosur.  João Aguiar Machado, Deputy Director-General for Trade of the European 
Commission, headed the EU Delegation.181 This first formal round after the collapse of the 
negotiations in 2004 had key importance in “structuring a pragmatic, flexible and effective 
working method, so that substantive improvements could be reached in the following 
rounds”.182 The general principles and objectives established by the parties during the first 
BNC in Buenos Aires, April 2000, would remain the reference framework for the 
continuation of negotiations. The parties should also take advantage of past work and 
experience, something that was particularly stressed.  The EU did however indicate that it 
would go in the direction of simplification of rules in some of the chapters. Both the EU and 
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Mercosur indicated that they would either be willing to table new proposals or consider 
reviewing their already indicated positions. Both the EU and Mercosur also agreed that the 
last official texts were exchanged in June 2004. Mercosur presented a nonofficial document in 
September 2004, which only contained some articles of its proposal. The EU reversed its 
position to the entire document. In the Public Procurement chapter, both the EU and Mercosur 
recognized that it was inconvenient to focus on and continue working on the old drafts 
exchanged until 2004, but would rather focus on a new approach to the negotiations. New 
texts would therefore be required, and the EU informed that it would submit a text proposal. 
Mercosur would also submit a text as soon as possible. Even though the two blocs expressed a 
will and engagement in making the negotiations easier by simplifying rules, the general 
principles and objective established in 2000 would remain the reference framework, and there 
were not listed any changes upon methods and modalities.183 
Before the second round of negotiations in September 2010, EU Trade Commissioner 
Karel De Gucht visited Argentina and Brazil to discuss the EU-Mercosur trade negotiations. 
De Gucht expressed that he saw important opportunities for EU exporters, investors and 
service providers in the Mercosur region, as well as that a balanced and ambitious FTA 
between the EU and Mercosur would be able to bring substantial economic benefits to both 
parties and contribute to the economic recovery. De Gucht did also express a belief in the 
negotiations to come.184 
The second round of negotiations was held in Brussels, October 11-15, 2010. During 
this week of negotiations, progress was made in the normative part. Regarding market access, 
both sides began discussions to lay the foundation for the exchange of improved offers. Both 
sides agreed to continue the work in this field.185 A report published in October 2010, showed 
that more than 330 trade restrictive measures had been taken by the European Union´s major 
trade partners since the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis in 2008. From these, 62 
were taken by Argentina, 12 by Brazil and 5 by Paraguay. As the EU was more strongly 
affected by the crisis than the global average, the impact of trade restrictive measures of EU 
trade was also larger than the WTO average. The Argentine import licensing system was of 
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serious concern.186 The report also showed that Brazil was among the countries that applied 
additional restrictions in the protection of domestic industry and jobs from foreign 
competition. The sectors in the EU that have been most affected by the trade restrictive 
measures are the agro-food, automotive, services, textile and clothing sectors.187  
The third round of negotiations was held in Brasília November 22 to December 7, 
2010. Twelve working groups held meetings during this round and they achieved progress in 
the normative part of several areas of the negotiations, including market access, rules of 
origin, services and investment, technical barriers to trade and dispute settlement among 
others. Both parties agreed to work on exchanging improved offers. At the same time, both 
parties recognized that further work would be necessary in several key areas.188 Before this 
round of negotiation, many were skeptical towards the negotiation, as none of the blocs 
wanted to be the first to offer concessions. Some of Latin America´s emergent economies 
were fearful of “Europe´s superior marketing and sales pitch for its goods and services” while 
the European feared “cheaper agricultural imports from South America”.189   
The fourth round of negotiation was held in March 14 to 18, 2011 in Brussels. Eleven 
working groups held meetings during this negotiation round and there were once again made 
progress in the normative part of several areas of the negotiations, as in areas as rules of 
origin, public procurement, services and investment, competition, and dispute settlement, 
among others. Both sides decided to continue their internal work to prepare for improved 
market access offers.190  
The fifth round of negotiation was held May 2 to 6, 2011 in Asunción, Paraguay. Both 
sides reaffirmed their commitment to move the negotiations forward in order to reach a 
comprehensive, ambitious and balanced association agreement. The eleven working groups 
that worked within the trade pillar achieved considerable progress in the regulatory texts of 
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the Bi-regional Agreement.191 Before the fifth round of negotiations, the independent news 
agency MercoPress reported that sources from Mercosur claimed that EU represented the 
most obstacles, as it was recovering from the recession from 2008/2009, while the Latin 
American countries managed to skip the same full impact of the recession. Within Europe 
some countries (France, Ireland, Belgium and Poland in particular) were still strongly 
opposed to an agreement that would and will impact the EU agricultural sector. De Gucht on 
the other hand insisted there was a political agreement from all members of the EU 
Commission to advance with the negotiations.192 
The sixth round of negotiation was held in Brussels, July 4 to 8, 2011. The negotiators 
from both sides once more stressed their commitment to move negotiations forward to reach a 
comprehensive, ambitious and balanced agreement. Through this round, the two sides 
exchanged views on many issues. The two blocs described the discussions as “fruitful”, 
something that also lead to a better understanding of each other’s views and positions.193 The 
round was completed without making any proposals over liberalized access of their products 
to the market. The two blocs should be aware of the different views and positions by now, as 
the negotiations had been going on for quite some time. This open and vague description of 
this round of negotiations might be a way of trying to cover up the fact that not much was 
really achieved. Unfortunately the two blocs did not manage to discuss the market access 
offers, as the EU signaled that this would not occur before the EU Commission had concluded 
an impact assessment of a future agreement and its impact on agriculture, which then would 
have to be read by the European Parliament. France, Belgium, Ireland and Poland in 
particular, were (and still are) skeptical towards the impact a future association agreement 
would have in the agricultural sector.194  
It is natural to ask the question why the EU put such an importance on this impact 
assessment. Why this emphasis at this stage? The opposition towards the relaunch of the 
rounds of negotiations has been quite strong within some of the EU member countries. The 
European Farmer´s Union, Copa-Cogeca has many times stressed the fact that an agreement 
between the EU and Mercosur would put further pressure on farmer´s incomes and even cause 
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“an exodus” from the sector and from rural areas. The President of Copa-Cogeca, Paolo Bruni 
expressed that “the EU Commission´s proposal to relaunch the trade talks with Mercosur will 
cause a sharp rise in beef, poultry, wheat, citrus fruit/juice imports to the EU from these 
countries”.195 At a meeting of EU agricultural ministers in Brussels, the French Agriculture 
Minister Bruno Le Marie expressed that “I don´t see why agriculture always has to be the 
bargaining chip in Europe´s trade negotiations [...] especially when a certain number of South 
American countries, notably Argentina, are putting new protectionist tariffs on food 
imports”.196 In May 2010, the number of EU countries that signed a joint declaration in 
opposition to a deal reached the number of “about 15”. The parties managed to reach a 
consensus, that the European Commission should assess the impact of any deal between the 
two blocs before it is signed, as well as not undermine progress in the stalled Doha Round.197 
This impact assessment is therefore a part of this consensus.  
The seventh round of negotiation was held in Montevideo, Uruguay, November 7 to 
11 2011. Eleven working groups worked with the Trade Pillar, and managed to achieve 
progress in the regulatory texts of the Bi-regional Agreement. In areas such as public 
procurement, the blocs again described the discussions as “fruitful”. Mercosur presented a 
written contribution on the issue of sustainable development.198 There were signals from 
Uruguayan officials before the round, that the expectations for important progress were low. 
Again the focus on agriculture was seen as the EU´s biggest obstacle to reach an 
agreement.199  
In December 2011, the Mercosur members announced that the trade bloc would ban 
any ship that were flying the Falklands flag from docking at ports in Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay and Paraguay. Even though this was mainly not taken too seriously, it still shows 
that Argentina used Mercosur in its disagreement with Great Britain.200 During the last few 
years the disagreement about the Falkland Islands /Islas Malvinas has escalated between 
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Great Britain and Argentina. There still does not seem to be any solution to the disagreement 
about the Falkland Islands/Las Malvinas. The dispute has been tense for a very long time, and 
2012 marked the 30th anniversary for the Falklands/Malvinas war between the Great Britain 
and Argentina. The dispute between the Great Britain and Argentina about the claim of the 
island escalated around the anniversary.201 The European Parliament has stressed that this 
issue is primarily a bilateral issue between Great Britain and Argentina.202 Even so, the 
disagreement concerning the island is having a negative impact on the negotiation climate. 
The eight round of negotiation was held in Buenos Aires from 12 to 16 March 2012. 
As in the seventh round of negotiation, the two blocs again used “fruitful exchanges of views” 
while describing the negotiation. This repeating use of “fruitful” and that the two blocs got “a 
better understanding of each other´s views”, while describing the round of negotiation, might 
be understood as another way of saying that the two blocs did not really make any clear steps 
forward in discussing concrete offers. The two sides continued the work within the trade 
pillar, clarifying positions and presenting new proposals.203 Even though the blocs made 
progress on the texts covering rules, competition, trade remedies, solution of controversies, 
government procurement, investment, rules of origin, technical barriers and sanitary 
measures, they still remain to exchange specific and concrete offers.204  
There is a general tendency in the official summaries from most of the rounds of 
negotiations that the two blocs “better understands” each other’s views. Due to the long and 
“tiring” negotiations that have never really made any big steps forward in actually reaching an 
agreement, this focus on discussions and a better understanding of each other´s views seem to 
be nothing more than a way of expressing that there were not any real steps forward in this 
Round of Negotiations either.  
In April 2012, Argentina expropriated 51% of YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales). This resulted in great opposition from Spain, as the Spanish company Repsol 
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controlled 57,4% of YPF.205 To get back on Argentina, Spain proposed to negotiate a bi-
regional agreement with Brazil and Uruguay without Argentina, as a represalia for the 
nationalization of YPF. Brazil and Uruguay rejected this proposal. This proposal shows the 
difficult relationship between Argentina and Spain. At the same time like the Argentine 
president of the Cámera de Importadores Argentina, Diego Pérez Santisteban expressed, the 
reaction of Brazil and Uruguay showed “un mensaje fuerte de seguir apoyando el bloque, más 
allá de las tensiones” (a strong message that one would continue to support the bloc despite 
the tensions).206  
In the European Commission Directorate-General for Trade´s Ninth Report on 
Potentially trade restrictive measures, identified in the context of the financial and economic 
crisis and published in May 2012, the trade restrictive measures taken by the EU´s most 
important partners are described. As also the WTO has expressed earlier, the report describes 
how the number of potentially trade restrictive measures adopted since the beginning of the 
crisis reached 534 in May 2012. 123 new measures were added from September 2011 to 1 
May 2012, while 13 measures were lifted. Even though the outlook seems to slowly improve, 
the number of trade restrictive measures steadily continued to increase, despite the pledges 
made by the G20 leaders. The report confirmed that there is a trend of third world countries 
using trade restrictive measures as part of new industrialization policies that are aiming at 
shielding their domestic markets from international competition. The report also highlighted 
that there are trends on trade related restrictive measures that cover foreign direct investment 
that has a potential negative impact on EU investors. An example here is, as mentioned above, 
the Argentine government´s decision to expropriate 51% of YPF shares owned by the Spanish 
company Repsol. Decisions like this do naturally substantially impact the investment climate 
for EU investors. While the unpredictability is increasing, the attractiveness to invest is 
getting limited. Argentina has also introduced other investment restrictions, such as a law 
established in October 2011, that foreign investments and assets of insurance companies 
cannot exceed 50% of their total capital. A consequence of this is that companies must 
repatriate investments from abroad. In addition to this, Argentina has also restricted the 
purchase of land by foreigners, and other discriminating measures against foreign 
investments. Out of the 534 trade restrictive measures taken by countries after the crisis in 
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2008, 119 are taken by Argentina, 38 by Brazil and 4 by Paraguay.207 In order to not 
undermine the recovery, the trading partners were called to remove the remaining restrictions. 
As De Gucht expressed and encouraged "with the economic recovery still fragile, the world's 
major economies must remove the trade restrictive measures that put a break on growth. For 
the world economy to move forward, we have to roll back these barriers. The G20 summit in 
Seoul needs to demonstrate leadership in this respect".208 The EU seems to be taking trade 
restrictive measures mainly against “rough” states, or states that in one or another way is to be 
sanctioned out of political reasons.209 The Mercosur countries do not seem to have been hurt 
by the trade restrictive measures that the EU has adopted in comparison to the measures 
adopted by some of their own member countries.  
The Brazilian business elites and diplomats have expressed their disappointment with 
Mercosur, and have urged Brazil to sign free trade agreements on its own with third countries, 
something that under Mercosur is forbidden. The “extreme positions” of Argentina that “only 
helps to put obstacles to an agreement with the European Union,” are expressed to be one of 
the reasons for their disappointment with Mercosur. Lately there have been signs of a 
Brazilian negativism/skepticism towards Mercosur. If this evolves it might have fatal impacts 
on Mercosur, as Brazil is Mercosur´s largest country.  If Brazil really wanted they could 
probably reverse the clause that limits signing trade accords with third countries. Sergio 
Amaral, a former diplomat and official from the government of ex President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, expressed that “the weight of Mercosur has eased, and is far less important 
for Brazil”.210 From an EU perspective, the importance of Mercosur is largely related to the 
importance of Brazil. This is mainly because Argentina has taken a strongly protectionist 
stance and that way offering very little in prospect for “fulfilling the EU´s general demand of 
deeper market access”.211 There have also been tensions between the two most powerful 
countries within Mercosur; Argentina and Brazil. Argentina and Brazil have become more 
protectionist under the left-wing governments, especially Argentina. It is as if the Mercosur 
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members see Mercosur as a fortress rather than a bridge. Since the establishment of Mercosur, 
hardly any agreements have been made with countries or regions outside of South America. 
The only trade deals concluded by Mercosur in the last decade were with the Palestinian 
Authority and Israel. Mercosur has basically not evolved into the single market that its 
founders seem to have dreamt of.212  
In January 2011, Argentina started to increase the items for which import licenses are 
not automatic; this is a measure accepted by the World Trade Organization that allows 
countries to detain imports for up to 60 days. The main problem has been that the delays have 
stretched even longer, something that has caused and prompted a host of complaints against 
Argentina. Even the other Mercosur members have been affected by the measures Argentina 
has taken. In 2012 Brazil´s exports to Argentina decreased compared to the same period in 
2011. The same counts for Uruguay. Brazil responded by imposing some barriers on 
Argentine exports. This shows the difficult situation. Even the countries within Mercosur are 
harming each other with strict import measures.213 
An internal problem in Mercosur the last year was the impeachment of Paraguay´s 
president, Fernando Lugo in June 2012. The Mercosur members rejected Lugo´s removal as 
undemocratic. The impeachment of Lugo resulted in the suspension of Paraguay from 
Mercosur until the next presidential elections, which took place in April 2013.214 Horacio 
Cartes from the conservative and nationalist political party, Partido Colorado, won the 
elections. Paraguay now has to decide whether or not they want to rejoin Mercosur as a 
member state.215 When Paraguay was suspended, sources from the EU warned that the EU 
would not sign any trade agreements with Mercosur without Paraguay. The German 
ambassador to Paraguay Claude Robert Ellner expressed that “For the European Union, 
Paraguay continues being a full member of Mercosur”.216 Paraguay has been the strongest 
opponent to Venezuelan full membership in Mercosur, but as soon as Paraguay was 
temporarily suspended, Venezuela was admitted to Mercosur in July 2012 as a full member 
with complete access to the voting rights and the common market. Analysts have 
characterized this move as mainly benefiting Argentina and Brazil, and that this will further 
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politicize the union. The Mercosur countries decided the impeachment of Paraguayan 
President Lugo offended the “democracy clause” of Mercosur. The implementation of 
Venezuela could be legally questioned, as Mercosur´s rules require all decisions to be 
unanimous. Paraguay´s foreign ministry denounced its suspension as “not only illegal but 
illegitimate and in violation of due process”.217 There have also been raised questions 
regarding Venezuela´s democracy. One of Mercosur´s main intentions was to advance free 
trade in South America. Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was unenthusiastic about 
this cause, while calling for a “new Mercosur” where one would “decontaminate 
neoliberalism” and instead “prioritize social concerns”. 218 Venezuela´s oil wealth has offered 
opportunities to the bloc, especially Argentine and Brazilian companies and particularly in 
government contracts. The entry of Venezuela therefore had a strategic interest. The 
admission of Venezuela as a full member has been called “perhaps the most serious 
institutional wound in Mercosur´s history” by Uruguay´s vice-President, Danilo Astori.219 
There seems to be a tendency that the governments of both Argentina and Brazil in a greater 
or lesser extent, share the view of Chávez that Mercosur should mainly serve as a political 
union, and maybe even as a “rival project to what they see as the free-trade agenda of the 
United States in Latin America”.220 The former Brazilian diplomat Rubens Barbosa, who was 
involved in the creation of Mercosur, said, “the founding idea that Mercosur would be an 
instrument of trade liberalization has disappeared […] What we have today is a political and 
social forum, and micromanagement of trade”.221 While some have expressed that Mercosur 
now exists of little more than “bear-hugs and kisses among compañeros,” others have stressed 
that there should be put more stress on market opening trade diplomacy and competitiveness 
to revive economic growth.222 Even though Mercosur have had a stronger negotiation position 
compared to the negotiations between 2000 and 2004, it can seem like regional bloc is going 
in a bad direction, where it to a greater extent is leaning towards a political union rather than a 
customs union. 
The ninth negotiation round was held in Brasília, October 22 to 26 2012. This was the 
XXV negotiation round since the negotiations formally started in 2000. As in former 
negotiation rounds, both sides reaffirmed their commitments to move negotiations forward to 
reach a “comprehensive, balanced and ambitious Association Agreement”. In the final 
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conclusions from the XXV Mercosur – European Union Biregional Negotiations Committee 
it was noted that “while progress had been made on the normative framework thus far, there 
is not enough scope for further progress under the current approach”. By expressing this, it 
is clear that the two blocs have to make some clear steps forward in order for the rounds of 
negotiations to have a chance to actually reach an agreement. Therefore, the EU underlined 
that it was now necessary to move to the exchange of market access offers on goods, services 
and investment, and government procurement. Mercosur considered that the negotiation had 
reached a point where it was necessary to seek guidance at ministerial level. This means that 
the negotiators had to look for guidance at a higher level to be able to present offers that are 
adequate and good enough for the other part to accept. The governments of the member states 
should therefore be involved to a greater extent. Both sides concurred that the Mercosur-
European Union Ministerial Meeting, to be held in parallel with the CELAC-EU Summit in 
Santiago, Chile, in January 2013 could provide such an opportunity. Mercosur did emphasize 
the importance of capacity building on customs cooperation. The EU on their side, agreed to 
define its position and provide information on this issue before the next round of negotiations. 
The parties agreed that the EU would send its proposals to Mercosur before the end of 2012 
while Mercosur would make its “best endeavours” to send its proposals to the EU at the latest 
one month before the next round.223 During this negotiation round, both sides reaffirmed their 
commitment to advance negotiations in order to reach an agreement. The negotiations 
centered on the future of the association agreement between the two blocs, and were held in 
the Political, Trade, and Cooperation Pillars of the future Agreement.224  
In December 2012, EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht expressed with a certain 
irritation, that he could not understand why Mercosur insisted in reopening negotiations in 
2010, while now some of its member states displayed a behavior that did not help the 
negotiations at all. Further he complained over how the EU was forced to go against 
Argentina in many complaints in the WTO. This was definitely not exactly adequate for 
making the climate in the negotiations for an Association/FTA better.225 De Gucht did 
however also express hopes that the ministerial meeting in Santiago the following year would 
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have positive outcomes but pointed out that “the ball is now in the South American court”.226 
The debate and complaints from many WTO members were emphasized when the EU25 
decided to formalize a consultation process with Argentina on the issue. The administration of 
Argentine President Cristina Fernandez followed this up by nationalizing a majority of the 
stakes in the Spanish oil corporation Repsol, as described earlier.227 This has made the 
negotiations harder and from the tone of De Guchts words, one can sense that the EU is 
getting tired of the Argentine way of “going solo” by ignoring the WTO standards and rules. 
 In January 2013, the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the European Union (EU), and the Presidents 
of the European Council and the European Commission met in Santiago de Chile.228 During 
the ministerial meeting, Argentina in particular took a very tough position towards Europe. 
While Argentina on its side has been strongly criticized for the strict controls on imports, 
Argentina on its side signalized that there should be a renegotiation of the conditions of the 
trade negotiations. Argentine President Cristina Fernandez stressed that Mercosur should 
discuss and “rework” new proposals for submission to the EU and this way reactivate the 
negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement. Fernandez said that the member states of Mercosur 
should work more closely together, not only Argentina and Brazil, but also Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, and in this way build a new scheme of premises. It was also stressed 
that the situation today is very different than the one in 2004 when the negotiations stalled. 229 
Again, Mercosur´s lack of being able to speak with one voice was visible, as Argentina once 
again was allowed to “run the show”.  
 The European countries on their side stressed the importance of open markets and that 
one should try to prevent protectionist measures. German chancellor, Angela Merkel stressed 
this at a meeting of business people, and used the situation in the 1920s and 30s as an 
example. The pro free trade presidents of Mexico and Chile supported the EU and Merkel´s 
point of view. Argentina and Brazil went on to promise the EU to revive stalled talks on the 
free trade agreement. 230 It is very important to the EU that the Mercosur countries do not 
impose strict protectionist measures, especially now that Europe and the EU are facing hard 
economical times. The EU therefore warned them “not to revert to the kind of protectionism 
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of the 1930s that deepened the Great Depression”. 231 As De Gucht expressed: “A tremendous 
effort has been made to install new momentum into the discussions”. 232 The EU is frustrated 
by Argentina and Brazil´s policies to protect local industry. It appears that Argentina and 
Mercosur are less eager to reach an agreement now compared to earlier, especially in 
comparison to the time when the Mercosur countries were in negotiations with the US of a 
FTAA. Mercosur and the EU have now agreed to exchange offers by the end of the year, and 
then one will see how far they will be willing to go in opening up sectors that are tied to extra 
“protection”, like services and agriculture.233 There seems to be dissatisfaction over the slow 
pace in the negotiations and the lack of a real breakthrough. The European Parliament has 
called for speeding the EU – Mercosur trade negotiations, as it called on both sides to “prove 
that negotiations have the sufficient political motivation” and “the significant political support 
to ensure an exchange of propositions sufficiently ambitious regarding access to the market 
for goods, services and investments and the other aspects of the agreement´s trade chapter”.234 
In order to reach an agreement, the European Parliament stressed the importance that both 
sides have to address the discussions with “an open mind and mutual trust.” 235 This might be 
a reaction to several factors; the general tendency of the rounds of negotiations that manage to 
“get lost” in talk about rules and modalities instead of actually making clear steps forward in 
order to present offers; the protectionist stance that especially Argentina and Brazil have 
showed the last years after the financial crisis; or a general lack of interest in reaching an 
agreement soon. The fact that the Argentine President, Cristina Fernandez started talking 
about a renegotiation of the terms might be seen as a way of dragging the negotiations further 
out.  
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) see the recent protectionist measures 
that have been adopted in trade and investments by some of the Mercosur countries recently, 
as “troublesome”. The declaration from the EP also highlighted the importance of including 
“abidance with democratic principles, human rights, fundamental rights and rule of the law as 
well as regulations referred to social and environment issues”.236 One important question is 
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whether the Mercosur countries are sufficiently interested in reaching an agreement or not, or 
to what extent they are willing to make sacrifices. In 2012 Brazil launched a second phase of 
the ”Plano Brasil Maior”; a plan that is meant to stimulate the Brazilian economy, where 
national goods and services take priority on imported goods. Argentina, as discussed earlier, 
has also adopted various trade restrictive measures that are hurting the EU economy. 
Argentina has attracted a lot of bad press recently, by imposing import restrictions that most 
probably violate the global trade rules. The United States, the EU and Japan have all 
complained about the import restrictions, and the WTO has now agreed to investigate 
Argentina.237 Lately, Brazil as well has expressed concerns with Argentina for not complying 
with understandings reached in previous meetings between the two countries, regarding 
limitations, restrictions and other obstacles that have been implemented by the Argentines.238 
During the meeting in Santiago de Chile in January, the two blocs decided to exchange 
offers towards the end of 2013. This exchange of offers will be very important in order to see 
whether the two blocs are serious about their intentions of reaching an agreement. 239 In 
February 2013, Argentina and Brazil announced that Mercosur would start the negotiations to 
define their offer to the EU in March.240 In a memo from the EU Commission from February 
2013, it is highlighted that it is now time for the two blocs to proceed to the exchange of 
market access offers if the two blocs want to “give a renewed impetus to this negotiation with 
the objective of concluding a balanced and ambitious trade agreement”.241 
Even though the EU-Mercosur negotiations on a FTA have lasted for quite some time, 
there have not been done many studies of the impact of such an agreement when it comes to 
trade flows. Some of the studies that have been made have highlighted that while the EU 
gains will be more widespread than the Mercosur gains, in form of being able to distribute 
themselves among various manufactured goods. Mercosur will rather have advantages from a 
few number of commodity exports. The economist, Renato G. Flôres Jr. suggests that it 
should not be very difficult to get a minimally acceptable agreement regarding the flow of 
goods. According to Flôres Jr., the EU has to be bold and liberalize half a dozen of 
                                                        
237 Jennifer M. Freedman (2013) WTO Judges to Probe Legality of Argentina’s Import Curbs. Available from 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-28/wto-judges-to-probe-legality-of-argentina-s-import-curbs.html 
(Accessed 02.02.13) 
238 Brazil furious with Cristina Fernandez non-kept promises freezes relation (2013) Available from 
http://en.mercopress.com/2013/05/04/brazil-furious-with-cristina-fernandez-non-kept-promises-freezes-
relation?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_content=main&utm_campaign=facebook (Accessed 
04.05.13) 
239 El Mercosur iniciará para definir su oferta a la UE (2013) 
240 El Mercosur iniciará para definir su oferta a la UE (2013) 
241 The EU's free trade agreements – where are we? (2013) Available from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-113_en.htm (Accessed 10.04.13) 
 63
agricultural goods, most in the meat category. Mercosur should try to make immediate or 
short-run liberalization of “about 50-100 manufactures, for the outcome to move quickly to 
the neighborhood of a Pareto optimum”.242 Flôres Jr. continues with that this would be 
feasible, provided that two mechanisms are successfully at work: a) “the EU couples its nice 
words to its gestures and really ensures the liberalization of the few commodities. The 
evolution – or optimistically, progressive dismantling – of the CAP and the present crisis 
might be intelligently used in favor of this argument;” and b) “Mercosur mainly selects 
recalcitrant Brazilian protectionists and quite a few sectors of Argentina´s vanishing 
manufacturing industry and manages to agree to an upfront liberalization that would 
nevertheless still give room for protecting so-called “sensitive items” with longer 
liberalization periods”. As these conditions might not be easy to fulfill, it is important that 
both sides lower their expectations and “work towards the possible, the ideal agreement”.243  
The economists Vera Thorstensen, Emerson Marçal, and Lucas Ferraz on the other 
side argue that the EU-Mercosur negotiations should concentrate on non-tariff barriers as 
customs practices, facilitation, rules of origin etc., in other words, on rules to reduce the 
differences between the partners´ practices. Only after the two blocs have managed to reach a 
solution to neutralize the effects of exchange misalignments in tariffs, the two blocs can move 
on to resume discussions on tariff reductions.244 Flôres and Thorstensen et al. therefore have 
different conceptions on how the two blocs should best tackle the negotiations and be able to 
come to an agreement. 
Mercosur is conscious of its needs for infrastructure upgrading and better logistics, 
something that has made Mercosur understand that it needs “the know-hows of sophisticated 
ancillary services for the functioning of the manufactures and commodities production 
networks, if not the whole productive system”.245 Protectionist trends have been promoting 
the revival of state champions in key service sectors in Mercosur, such as in telecoms. The 
euro crisis has probably been a factor for protectionist views on the European side in certain 
important sectors. An example of this can be found in the financial and insurance domains 
where the European Commission has been a “fierce advocate of the conservative positions of 
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individual member states”.246 With today’s situation, it might be hard to see what could be 
possible in the EU-Mercosur relations/negotiations in the immediate future. Flôres suggests 
that the approach must aim at the feasible, and aim at liberalization in some areas, instead of 
aiming at many at the same time. Examples of feasible areas could for example be industrial 
services, some aspects of telecom.247 Whether the approach of Flôres, or the approach of 
Thorstensen et al. would be the best for the EU and Mercosur is hard to say. But as the two 
blocs are struggling to come to an agreement, the approach of Thorstensen et al. might be the 
best in light of today´s situation. 
 While Europe is now suffering high unemployment rates in many member countries, 
there is a strong motivation for the EU to “close any prospects along this line”.248  Particularly 
Brazil faces, at the same time, “shortages of qualified people, partially owing to its 
demographic evolution”.249 Flôres suggests that Mercosur could use this as a bargaining asset, 
and an innovative compromise could be struck.250  
 
4.3 The EU-Mercosur interregional relations from a theoretical perspective 
 
The EU and Mercosur have been negotiating an agreement since 2000. Why did, and still do, 
the two blocs wish to negotiate an EU-Mercosur Association/FTA, and why have the two 
blocs not yet been able to come to an agreement? 
 
The post-Cold War climate stimulated an expansion of regionalism and globalization, and the 
need to institutionalize at a new level in international regionalism emerged. It was in light of 
these events that the EU and Mercosur decided to engage in closer interregional relations and 
start rounds of negotiations in order to eventually reach an association agreement, or even a 
FTA.251 So far, these rounds of negotiations have not lead to the signing of an association, nor 
a FTA, but the two blocs have expressed a positive attitude and belief that the negotiations 
will eventually lead to the signing of an agreement. In order to understand why the two blocs 
decided to engage in negotiations with each other, and why the rounds of negotiations have 
not yet lead to the signing of an agreement, it is important to take a closer look at the context 
in which the rounds of negotiations have taken and still take place. The world situation, not 
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the least the situation within and between the two blocs, is different today than what it was in 
2000 and when the negotiations stalled in 2004. In order to get a better overview, the 
negotiations from 2000 until 2004 and the rounds of negotiation after the relaunch in 2010 
will be analyzed separately using a top-down and bottom-up approach. Finally I will compare 
and analyze the different reasons for why the two blocs have decided to engage in 
negotiations. Different reasons for why the two blocs have not yet managed to come to an 
agreement will also be discussed. 
 
The two blocs had various different reasons for engaging in interregional relations with each 
other in 2000. The context in which the EU and Mercosur first decided to engage in 
interregional negotiations was an interesting time in international relations. The post-Cold 
War climate presented more opportunities, Mercosur was established, and the EC/EU decided 
to put more emphasis on their relations with Latin America, mainly the Mercosur countries. 
This increased EC/EU interest in Latin America had various reasons. First of all, Spain and 
Portugal worked hard to make the EU relationship with Latin America and especially 
Mercosur closer, both for historical, cultural and economical reasons.252 Even though Spain 
and Portugal in particular were eager to have closer relations to Mercosur, the EU also had 
other reasons than cultural, historical and economical interest in engaging in closer relations 
with Mercosur. This common cultural heritage is one of various factors that made the EU put 
more emphasis on tying closer bounds to the Mercosur countries. According to the lawyers 
Roberto Dromi and Carlos Molina del Pozo, the importance of the EU-Mercosur common 
cultural history, not only stems from the colonization period, but also the large amount of 
immigrants that have arrived in Latin America since then, as well as the large amount of 
immigrants from Latin America to Europe. This continuous contact has produced similar 
political, historical, economic and cultural traditions, which has connected the blocs even 
further.253 Andy Klom also stresses the importance of the common EU-Mercosur cultural, 
historical and linguistic references.254 
 In order to get a better overview over the different reasons, the top-down and bottom-
up approaches will be used to categorize the different reasons for the two blocs to engage in 
an interregional relationship. According to Doctor, the main reasons for why the EU and 
Mercosur engaged in interregional relations and desired to sign an EU-Mercosur agreement 
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were: a) the international context in the 1990s, and the challenges posed by globalization and 
the post-Cold War bi-polarity; b) strategic preferences of political actors in both regions; c) 
interests of economic and other societal actors that wanted to minimize losses from 
integration and reform, and harness gains. The globalization encouraged state and trans-
national actors to coalition building.255 Among the most important EU top-down approaches 
to the interregional relations with Mercosur, were a fear of expanding US activity in the 
region, both through the Initiative of the Americas (1990), the NAFTA in 1994, and the 
launch of the FTAA negotiations in 1999.256 It was indeed very important for the EU to 
counterbalance the US influence.257 Sebastian Santander has also stressed the fact that the EU 
was afraid the US would become too influential in Latin America, both through the NAFTA 
and the FTAA.258 The fear of a too strong US influence drove the EU to engage in closer 
relations with Mercosur. One of the instruments used by the EU in securing that the US would 
not become too influential in the region was the export of EU institutional models in order to 
support liberal democracy, market economies with liberal economic governance structures 
and interregionalism to work as a framework for the interregional relations with Mercosur.259 
The EU would this way be the part influencing Mercosur at the greater extent. According to 
the EU ideals and experience, it was very important to institutionalize the relationship with 
Mercosur in order to succeed. The signing of the EMIFCA in 1995 was therefore a very 
important step for the EU.260 According to a liberal institutionalist approach, institutionalism 
is an instrument to lock-in a relationship and “set rules of conduct which both sides have to 
ratify and adhere to”.261 The cooperation between the two blocs enabled the EU to export its 
regional governance model, and that way also managed to increase its reputation as an 
international actor. The group-to-group strategy has also “encouraged the harmonization of 
economic rules at the regional level so that Mercosur could create its own customs union”.262 
As Hardacre, puts it: “Interregionalism, as a concept, plays to EU strengths, where 
institutional and commercial power is the key to promoting its own values and institutional 
forms abroad”.263  
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The EU intentions of exporting their values and institutions can also be seen from a 
rival interregionalist view (a combination of realist and liberal institutionalist approaches), 
where the EU clearly used the interregional relations with Mercosur to “export their values 
and concepts of order” to Mercosur. In this way, interregionalism becomes an “institutional 
mechanism to export values, ideas and ideals”.264 By exporting its own institutions, values 
and norms, the EU hoped to gain a certain control over Mercosur.265 
The EU also searched for a solution to its growing unemployment problem, and saw 
cooperation with the Mercosur region as a good strategy.266 The EU therefore clearly had 
underlying economical and commercial interests for securing the Mercosur market, not only 
securing EU goods, but also to gain better access to jobs in Mercosur for the EU population.  
 From a bottom-up approach, there were also regionally organized businesses that were 
active in the process of the interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur, whether 
pushing for market opening (for instance the service sector/ automobile sector), or seeking to 
maintain protectionist policies (for instance the agricultural sector). The industrial and service 
sector in the EU lobbied hard for a further liberalization of the Mercosur market, while the 
farm and agribusinesses within the EU did everything they could to prevent the launch of the 
interregional negotiations. In the EU there were therefore, both from a top-down and a 
bottom-up approach, many parties that wanted to engage in interregional relations with 
Mercosur. The reasons varied from social constructivist reasons (common cultural 
references), to commercial interests, a liberal institutionalist driven interest to export the EU 
institutions, and more strongly realist driven interests as balancing the US influence.  
 Mercosur, from a top-down approach, also had clear advantages in engaging in closer 
interregional relations with the EU. By keeping a parallel on the different negotiations with 
the WTO, FTAA and EU-Mercosur, Mercosur could play off the EU against the USA in order 
to obtain better bargaining results from both negotiations. The Mercosur negotiators knew 
that the EU would have to yield on the issue of agriculture, and the Mercosur negotiators 
therefore became less “inclined to bargain in an exchange for a reform that was anyway on 
the cards”.267 Many political actors in Mercosur saw interregionalism as a way of mitigating 
the impact of market liberalization. Mercosur governments were eager to attract more EU 
investment as well as to get a greater access for their agricultural products.  At the same time 
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they were carefully balancing the benefits they would gain from an agreement with the 
concessions they would have to make. The Mercosur took in other words a realist position in 
this case.268 Mercosur also used the negotiations with the EU to counter balance US influence 
in the region, and at the same time enhancing its own position in other fora. From a social 
constructivist and liberal-institutionalist argument, the Mercosur countries identified with the 
EU model, which also served as a model for Mercosur. By tying closer relations with the EU, 
Mercosur could strengthen their own regionalism.269 As the EU represented a big market for 
Mercosur agricultural goods, Mercosur wanted the EU to eliminate CAP barriers and 
subsidies, which were harming the Mercosur agricultural goods.270 
From a bottom-up approach, the manufacturing and service sector in Mercosur 
understood the importance of EU FDI.271 At the same time, the manufacturing and service 
sector in Mercosur were more hesitant to further liberalize and open their markets for EU 
businesses.272 The farm and agricultural sector in Mercosur demanded that the EU should 
guarantee access for their products. Over time, Mercosur did become less insistent on this 
issue; both as there was an increasing demand for Mercosur agricultural products in China as 
well as the Mercosur agri-business lobby became less insistent on an immediate agreement on 
the matter.273 
 
There is not one, but many factors that lead the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur to 
stall in 2004. The two blocs did not manage to present sufficient offers that the other part 
could accept, but other events and factors were just as important in causing the negotiations to 
reach a dead-lock. One of the main reasons could be understood from the theoretical aspects 
of interregionalism. The concept of balancing seems to be one of the main factors for both 
regions to engage in interregional negotiations in the first place. The EU wanted to balance 
the US influence and power in Latin America, in order to prevent loosing markets and 
influence in the long term, while Mercosur wanted to counterbalance the US influence and 
power with the one of the EU. Even though the liberal-institutionalist and social constructivist 
concepts had their impacts on the will and decision of the two blocs to start the negotiations, 
the one of the realist balancing seems to be the one concept that was determining the will of 
the two blocs to negotiate. When the FTAA negotiations stagnated and the US foreign policy 
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and attention in a greater extent shifted towards the Middle East after 9/11, one of the EU and 
Mercosur´s main reasons for negotiating slowly diminished. The EU as well downgraded 
Latin America in its external agenda. According to Santander, the EU has to a greater extent 
focused on security, whereas most Latin American countries have focused more on trade and 
economic issues.274 The EU´s economical interests in Mercosur should though not be 
downgraded. The EU wanted to secure that the USA did not manage to become too influential 
in the Mercosur region, and one of the reasons for this was to prevent loosing markets to the 
US in the long term. The EU had managed to somehow secure its commercial interests 
through FDI and export of their institutional framework. The internal opposition within the 
EU towards an agreement was also strong, especially from the agricultural sector. In a 
situation where there was not a “urgent need” to come to an agreement, the EU showed signs 
of not doing its best in order to come to an understanding with Mercosur concerning offers. 
Mercosur as well did in many ways loose one of its main reasons to rush an agreement when 
the FTAA negotiations stalled. The EU was not needed in the same extent to counterbalance 
the US influence, as the US influence and activity diminished. The negotiations with the EU 
had already secured increasing EU FDI in the Mercosur countries, and as the EU was not 
willing to fully open their barriers for Mercosur agricultural goods, it was not pressing to 
come to an agreement. The liberal institutionalist reasons for continuing the rounds of 
negotiations were not strong enough alone, as the balancing part was not as eminent. Even 
though the social constructivist approach had an influential impact at launching the 
interregional negotiations (as Spain and Portugal, the two EU countries with closest cultural 
and historical ties to Latin America, pressed to initiate the negotiations), this approach was 
not important enough to prevent the negotiations to stall. The reasons for rushing an 
agreement at that point of time were simply not as important any longer. Through the rounds 
of negotiations, there was a clear tendency that the two blocs lost some of the will and reason 
to come to an agreement, in comparison with just letting them stall. Both blocs had gradually 
lost their main reasons for coming to an agreement if that meant making offers that would 
cause strong internal opposition. Both blocs also had shifting interests and as the US activity 
and influence slowly decreased, so did the will and engagement of the two blocs.  
 
When the two blocs decided to relaunch the negotiations in 2010, the context of which the 
rounds of negotiations were launched in 2000, had changed in many ways. Since the 
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negotiations stalled October 2004, until they were relaunched in May 2010, a lot had 
happened and changed in the international arena. The financial crisis that broke out in 2008 
caused more harm in Europe than in the Mercosur region. The Doha Round reached its 
impasse in 2010, and there were no agreement in sight in the short term. This is one reason for 
the two blocs to relaunch the EU-Mercosur negotiations.275 According to Patrizia Luíza Kegel 
and Mohamed Amal, the impasse in the Doha Round of discussions suggested that it is 
unlikely that a “a new agenda for international trade relations in which the strengthening of 
institutions, namely the strengthening of legality” will be adopted in the short term”.276 As the 
Doha Round stagnated, the EU sees an even greater need to rationalize the EU-Mercosur 
interregional relations in order to rationalize international relations.277 A rationalizing 
approach in the EU-Mercosur relations could maybe work as a mechanism that in a greater 
extent would harmonize the EU and Mercosur interests, regulations and rules, and that way 
work as a “zone of retreat” when multilateralism is slow.278  
 From a top-down approach, the EU searched for ways to stabilize and improve the 
economical situation in Europe after the financial crisis broke out in 2008. While the EU was 
(and still is) suffering, the Mercosur region had not been affected to the same extent. As the 
political scientist Jamie Hancock notes, “liberalization would be especially beneficial for the 
debt-stricken EU, as the added appeal of budget constraints also tends to encourage 
liberalization”.279 Even though the EU budget spending on the CAP has shown tendencies of 
decreasing, the CAP still receives around 40 % of the EU budget today.280 The agricultural 
lobby within the EU, led by French farmers, has been the most vocal group in opposition 
towards an agreement with the Mercosur. Over the last years, however, there has been a shift 
in European public opinion when it comes to farming subsidies. The public opinion has 
turned away from supporting farming subsidies at the same extent as earlier.281   
The EU agricultural sector has been one of the most sensitive issues in the EU-
Mercosur negotiations. While the EU has faced hard opposition from traditional agricultural 
countries like France in particular, the issue of opening the EU markets to Mercosur 
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agricultural products has so far been avoided in the negotiations after 2010. France ranks as 
the most protectionist country in the EU when it comes to trade, and the French attitude has 
usually been explained as a consequence of the influence and strength of the agrarian lobby. 
The social scientist Dieter Konold interprets this excuse or explanation as simply a French 
excuse to achieve its own political agenda. The reality shows that agricultural reforms have 
been successfully implemented over the last ten years against the opposition of the farm 
lobby. The French government has had an impact on the EU-Mercosur negotiations, as it has 
fended off demands for liberalization, using the farm interests as an excuse.282 Through his 
investigations of the theme, Konold discovered that the French farmer´s association has lost 
its former influential power to shape the agrarian politics. Konold further explains the high 
degree of unanimity between the interest of the agricultural sector and that of the government, 
as common interest and as a bargaining tactic of the French government in international 
negotiations. The French government wants to protect and maintain the generous system of 
subsidies that the country receives through the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
The subsidies that France receives through the CAP do not only benefit the farmers, but also 
the French treasury. Farm groups in France do not longer have the same place within the 
political system as they had earlier, and the lobby´s ability to exercise influence all depends 
on the willingness of the government.283 France has a clear advantage if it is perceived that 
there is a strong domestic opposition, as this can help the government take a tough stance of 
controversial topics, as for example the “maintenance of high level protection”. If it seems 
like moving away from the bargaining position will threaten the ratification, the negotiation 
partners are more likely to accept more than they would do in another situation.284 If Konold´s 
studies are applicable to the other EU member states as well, it might just be a question of 
time before the EU could go through with greater CAP reforms and eventually open up the 
EU markets for Mercosur agricultural goods. If it is “revealed” that the French government is 
hiding behind excuses of strong opposition from the agricultural sector, and at the same time 
ignoring the opposition if it does not serve the cause of the government, then these “excuses” 
might not be that important that they cannot be ignored by the EU in the long run. The EU has 
in other words shown signs of moving towards greater reforms and liberalization of the 
agricultural sector. 
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It was important for the EU to secure new markets to make the economy heal faster. 
One of the EU´s main reasons to relaunch the rounds of negotiation with Mercosur was 
therefore economically driven. The securing of markets, as well as gaining a better access to a 
larger job market was also important, as the unemployment rate in some parts of Europe was 
unreasonably high (for instance in Spain and Greece).  
The aspect of balancing was once again an important aspect for the EU when deciding 
to relaunch the negotiations. This time it was not the US influence in Latin America that was 
the problem, but rather an increasing Chinese activity.285  As one of EU´s main factors for 
focusing on the Mercosur region before the launch of the EU-Mercosur negotiations in 2000, 
were in fear in increasing US influence and power, the situation had changed, as China now 
was the state posing an underlying threat to EU influence and power in the region. This 
commercial balancing was important for the EU to secure their interest and future commercial 
gains in the area. Even though one of the EU´s main reasons for relaunching the negotiations 
were commercially driven and had a clear balancing approach, the situation today is still 
slightly different in comparison with the situation when the two blocs launched the rounds of 
negotiations in 2000. The EU clearly both had an approach of commercial balancing and 
institutional balancing. By influencing and stimulating harmonization and institution building 
in Mercosur, the EU will be able to strengthen its own reputation as an international actor.286 
By influencing and securing its institutional model, the EU will be able to exert influence.287 
As the main aspect of relaunching the negotiations, the EU used the balancing and 
institutionalist approach in order to secure their commercial interest and try to find a way out 
of the financial crisis by achieving liberalization of markets in Mercosur. One important 
aspect, that should be mentioned, is that while the EU had a clear advantage being the 
stronger one out of the two blocs in the former negotiations, the EU´s role had diminished by 
the relaunch. One of the reasons for this can be blamed on the position that the financial crisis 
puts the EU and the EU´s need for liberalization of markets. According to Santander, new 
interregionalism as well as new regionalism encourage and legitimize the policies of 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization as part of the development of a globally 
integrated market. Yet interregionalism also perpetuates trade arrangements with a strong 
North-South bias. The type of interregionalism between the EU and Mercosur is mainly 
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skewed towards economic affairs that aim to open up markets.288 Even though there is still a 
North-South aspect to the EU-Mercosur negotiations, the financial crisis and the EU urge and 
need to heal its economy, have caused a weaker EU bargaining position compared to the 
former negotiations.  
 From a liberal institutionalist approach, the EU still has a need to secure and export its 
institutions, rules and norms. Santander discusses how the EU cannot really be seen as an 
international actor, as it is not a sovereign entity (it lacks a centralized decision-making 
authority and has no real military capacity of its own). Yet in the field of “low politics”, when 
it comes to foreign trade and cooperation with other countries or regional blocs, the EU has a 
great influential role worldwide. Today, the EU is among the leading trading powers in the 
world.289 Many Europeans consider Mercosur a child of the EU process and structures, and 
should therefore follow the EU model of integration. 290 The interregional relations with 
Mercosur are also important to the EU in order to, at a greater extent, be perceived as an 
important international actor. According to a paper written by Kegel and Amal, an agreement 
with Mercosur would make it possible for the EU to expand its influence outside of traditional 
geographic areas. This could also be seen as an extension of the EU´s goal of “the 
construction of a multi-polar world, with emphasis on regional integration and which is open 
to the actions of its economic agents”.291 
 From a bottom-up approach, the same regionally organized businesses as before were 
either eager (for instance the service sector and the automobile sector) to relaunch the 
negotiations with Mercosur, while the agricultural sector was strongly opposed to an 
agreement. Even though the agricultural sector was strongly opposed, the studies of Konold, 
as discussed earlier, show that the agricultural sector has a weaker voice and influence than 
earlier.  The EU approach towards relaunching the negotiations was still strongly top-down, 
as the EU is doing its best to get out of the financial problems that the crisis caused.  
The Mercosur top-down approach also mainly had balancing and commercial reasons 
for relaunching the negotiations with the EU. Over the past years, Asia has become one of the 
main markets for products from Mercosur, something that has also reduced the importance of 
the US and EU markets, but at the same time has lead to a concern among the Mercosur 
member states that they will become overly dependent on exports to Asia. As the EU wanted 
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to prevent a too strong Chinese activity and influence in Mercosur and its market, Mercosur 
wanted the EU in order to counter balance the Chinese influence. According to Kegel and 
Amal, Mercosur has a need to diversify markets, and this makes Mercosur reduce the 
resistance to opening up their industry sector. This may further also reduce the ambitions that 
Mercosur has in the agricultural sector negotiations with the EU. In the EU, it is hard to 
articulate an internal consensus among the member countries.292 Mercosur did in other words 
still have some of the same main reasons for relaunching the negotiations as it had while the 
negotiations were launched in 2000; counter balancing. 
Mercosur is focusing on creating a regional legitimacy and in that way reach a better 
strategic positioning in the region.293 By coming to an agreement with the EU, this might help 
Mercosur´s regional legitimacy. In the interregional relations with the EU, the Mercosur 
member states are under pressure to speak with one voice. This do involve that the member 
states have to do their best to harmonize their positions. In the words of Sebastian Santander: 
“The prospect of concluding an ambitious agreement with the EU increases both the 
deepening and the international credibility of Mercosur”.294 According to Santander, 
“interregionalism is, thus, closely linked to the EU´s intention to play a greater role 
internationally. The emergence of interregionalist relational arrangements should be seen in 
the light of this intention”.295 The political scientists Karl Kaltenthaler and Frank O. Mora, 
have in their work concluded that it is not very likely that Mercosur will develop the kinds of 
supranational governance institutions as those present in the EU. The reason for this is that the 
Mercosur member states were primarily driven by domestic political considerations when 
they decided to further the integration process.296 According to Kaltenthaler and Mora, the 
main motivations for the Mercosur countries to integration, were originally to resolve the 
security dilemma between Argentina and Brazil, as well as domestic, political and economic 
liberalization. The member states sought to achieve domestic political and economic ends 
through international rules and/or institutions. The Mercosur member states want the 
“maximum economic and political benefits from integration while foregoing as little 
sovereignty as possible”.297 This lack of institutionalism, or rather supranational institutions in 
Mercosur have had its impact on the negotiations between the EU and Mercosur. While the 
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EU in a greater extent was able to speak with one voice, Mercosur did not have the same 
possibility. The political scientist Mario E. Carranza has also stressed the importance of the 
Mercosur member states, Argentina and Brazil in particular, to coordinate macroeconomic 
policies. There is also a need for supranational institutions and effective dispute settlement 
systems.298 The lack of institutionalism has been a clear problem in the negotiations, as single 
countries (Argentina in particular) has been able to impact the negotiation climate, both 
within Mercosur and between the two blocs. In 1997, Eduardo Casullo, the executive director 
of the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), expressed that the lack of institutionalism in 
Mercosur is bad for the union.299 While Mercosur has been criticized or rather questioned for 
its lack of supranational institutions, the political scientist Marcos Aurelio Guedes de Oliveira 
criticizes the way Mercosur is being criticized for not having the same political structures, or 
how the lack of supranational institutions in Mercosur is perceived as being weak. He argues 
that one cannot perceive or study the EU and Mercosur in the same way, with the same 
theoretical framework, as the historical background and context of the two blocs are so 
different. He further stresses that Mercosur is moving in the right direction, and that Mercosur 
is going through an important progress through its intergovernmental structures and 
mechanisms. There is a slow, but steady transition, and the member countries are moving in 
the right direction regarding democracy and economic stability.300 Yet, Guedes de Oliveira 
sees the need for a dispute-solution mechanism that is empowered and capable to deal with 
conflicts, that will make the presidential and ministerial meetings within Mercosur to go more 
smoothly.301 
From a bottom-up approach, Mercosur´s agricultural sector is still greatly in favor of 
an agreement with the EU, as the EU represents a significant market. Mercosur wanted and 
still wants the EU to eliminate CAP barriers and subsidies, which are harming the Mercosur 
agricultural goods.302 Mercosur is interested in the EU agriculture market, while the EU is 
more interested in the Mercosur car, industrial and service markets. These different interests 
could make the relationship more complementary, but both blocs are resisting in opening up 
their markets, as they both fear the other one´s stronger competition.303  
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5. Conclusion 
 
After all these years and all the time and energy spent on negotiating an EU-Mercosur 
Association Agreement/FTA, why have the two blocs not yet managed to come to an 
agreement? From the theoretical perspective of interregionalism, the realist, liberal 
institutionalist and social constructivist approaches have been used in the discussion of the 
EU-Mercosur interregional relations. But can they explain the reason for why the two blocs 
not yet have managed to come to an agreement?  
 Even though commercial interests, that can be closely tied to the realist approach, have 
clearly been one of the main motivations for both blocs in engaging in interregional relations, 
the reasons that have been explained from a liberal institutionalist and social constructivist 
approach have also been important. According to the theory of interregionalism, there should 
be nothing hindering a EU-Mercosur association agreement, as both blocs clearly would, and 
still will gain benefits from such an agreement. Even though both blocs express a wish to 
come to an agreement, they still do not seem to have a strong enough pressure to be able to 
present good offers that both are willing to accept. There seem to be too many obstacles and 
internal opposition towards an agreement. Even though both blocs would benefit from an 
agreement, an agreement would also have a negative effect on certain sectors in both blocs. 
For instance the agricultural sector in the EU would experience great competition from 
Mercosur agricultural products (in particular Argentine and Brazilian agricultural products) 
that are far more competitive than the EU agricultural products. Sectors within Mercosur, for 
instance the manufacture, service and automobile sectors, would also face strong competition 
from these EU sectors. In some cases the EU sectors would even pose a threat to outdo some 
of these sectors in Mercosur. The many different actors (often with differing agendas) 
involved in the negotiations in one way or the other make the negotiations even more 
complex and harder. This might indeed be one of the reasons why there still does not exist 
any interregional agreements like the one the EU and Mercosur are negotiating. This might be 
the weak point of the theory of interregionalism; it does not manage to explain why blocs that 
have much to gain, still does not manage to reach an agreement, as is does not handle the 
problem of the complexities in interregional negotiations in a sufficient way. As an 
interregional relationship have a low level of institutionalism, there is a greater chance for 
single actors, and/or countries to obstruct and pose obstacles to the negotiations. 
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 Karel De Gucht, expressed as late as in December 2012, an irritation over the 
Argentine behavior the last years, especially aiming at the large amount of trade restrictive 
measures that the country have implemented after the financial crisis in 2008.304 Argentina 
has also been in the center of many other disagreements, both internally with Uruguay (the 
pulp mill disagreement), as well as with EU countries Spain (over the Argentine expropriation 
of Repsol stakes); Great Britain (the disagreement concerning the Falkland Islands/ Las 
Malvinas), and EU itself (considering trade restrictive measures enforced by Argentina, where 
the EU has been forced to go against the country in the WTO). The Argentine behavior has 
caused friction and irritation within Mercosur. Brazilian business people have also expressed 
their discontent with the Argentine way of “going their way”.305 The Argentine “way” of 
going unilaterally has therefore not only caused irritation within Mercosur but also in the EU. 
Even though it is not fair to blame the lack of an agreement on the Argentine behavior, the 
situation even more so highlights the Mercosur´s lack of institutions and not being able to 
speak with one voice in the same way as the EU. It is also a good example of how one 
country can pose a potential threat, or even prevent the parts of coming to an agreement. This 
lack of “one voice” or even “unity” within Mercosur has posed many obstacles to the 
negotiations, and still seem to be one of the main problems and obstacles in order to reach an 
agreement. As long as single countries can influence the negotiations to such an extent, as has 
been a tendency especially in the negotiations after the relaunch in 2010, it might be hard to 
be able to reach an agreement in the closest future. Argentina and Brazil often seem to have 
run Mercosur out from their countries´ interest and economical benefits, something that was 
highlighted when Venezuela was implemented in Mercosur as a full member in December 
2012.306  
As discussed earlier, Thorstensen et al. argue that the EU-Mercosur negotiations 
should concentrate on non-tariff barriers, or on rules to reduce the differences between the 
partners´ practices. They further argue that only after the two blocs have managed to reach a 
solution to neutralize the effects of exchange misalignments and tariffs, the two blocs can 
move on to resume discussions on tariff reductions.307 Hancock has argued that the trade talks 
between the EU and Mercosur have failed so far, because of “the failures of the Doha Round 
and the FTAA, the opposition within the EU, the fragility of inter-Mercosur relations, and the 
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changing global economic climate, that especially affects the EU”.308 The approach of 
Thorstensen et al. is probably the most realistic approach considering the situation today.  
The interregional relations between the EU and Mercosur represent a very good case 
of interregionalism. As a matter of fact, the interregional relations between the two blocs can 
be perceived as a dialogue (according to Rüland´s definition of the term), where the 
cooperation and exchange of information covers various areas (public procurement, services 
and investment, dispute settlement etc.). At the same time, the EU-Mercosur interregional 
relations can also be perceived as a process (according to Roloff´s definition of the term), 
seeing the interregional relation between the two blocs as through the rounds of negotiations 
consistently moving towards a more advanced and deeper relationship. This is of course 
dependent on that the negotiations do not to stall again. Hardacre´s definition of interregional 
relations as a “comprehensive relationship that covers trade, political and cooperation pillars 
through frequent work at all official levels” seems to be like a perfection of interregional 
relations, and is basically what the two blocs are trying to achieve.309 The two blocs are 
aiming at reaching a comprehensive agreement, as are struggling in the trade pillar/chapter of 
the negotiations. As Rüland stresses, interregionalism is built on a low level of 
institutionalism and both blocs therefore have to rely on their own institutional 
infrastructure.310 As the lack of institutionalism in Mercosur has proven to be one of the 
difficulties in reaching an agreement, this lack of institutionalism might indeed be one of the 
main problems of interregionalism. Because of this low level of institutionalism, there will 
also be low levels of rationalization and agenda setting. These functions are therefore hard to 
find empirical evidence for. 
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